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COMPULSORY [MIS]JOINDER: THE UNTENABLE 
INTERSECTION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND FEDERAL 
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 19 
ABSTRACT 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 defines circumstances in which a court 
can (and must) override the plaintiff’s party structure to ensure that so-called 
necessary and required parties are before the court, as complete justice 
requires.  Sovereign immunity protects classes of sovereigns and their political 
arms from accountability in other nations’ court systems.  Although seemingly 
unrelated, conflict between these doctrines is increasingly precipitating 
incongruous outcomes in federal courts—as evident in a recent Supreme Court 
decision—eviscerating the goals of compulsory joinder and unreasonably 
enlarging the ambit of sovereignty’s protections to shield nonsovereign 
parties.  The failure of courts to work solutions to the Rule 19/sovereign 
immunity conundrum risks recreating the systemic failures of the original 
version of Rule 19—foregoing the Rule’s intended pragmatism in favor of 
doctrinal adherence to labels and categorizations. 
No single solution will make the conflicting aims of Rule 19 and sovereign 
immunity compatible in every instance.  Rule 19, however, has never been 
amenable to universal conceptualizations or strict applications.  It is quite the 
opposite: a rule grounded in pragmatism that commands a case-by-case 
application.  To that end, courts need to turn unerringly to a pragmatic 
approach to Rule 19 and sovereign immunity, looking at a variety of solutions 
that exist to lessen the prejudice to sovereigns without closing the courthouse 
doors completely.  Likewise, Congress and parties to disputes must each act to 
encourage outcomes that avoid complete dismissal of disputes with no 
alternative forum.  Reformulating the status quo’s approach to Rule 19 vis-à-
vis sovereign immunity is not without its difficulties, but remembering the 
broad aims of the two doctrines and attempting a workable permutation of 
both is the only way to keep the Rule responsive to the needs of claimants while 
appropriately circumscribing—but not imperiling—the shield of sovereign 
immunity. 
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Thus does this ghostly character [the indispensable party] haunt the 
halls of justice, an apparition whose suggested existence stays the 
hand of the law.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—joinder of “required” 
parties2—seeks to ensure that any party with an appreciable stake in the 
outcome of a lawsuit is adequately represented therein.3  The Rule protects 
three often-overlapping classes of interests: (1) the interests of parties already 
present in the litigation, (2) the interests of those not yet made a party, and (3) 
the interests of society in the efficient and complete resolution of disputes.4 
The Supreme Court has addressed the general workings of Rule 19 in 
significant detail only a handful of times, most notably in two decisions: 
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson5 and Temple v. Synthes 
Corp.6  In both cases, the Court overturned decisions in which the appellate 
courts dismissed lawsuits for failure to join an indispensable party.  The 
Supreme Court’s Rule 19 jurisprudence evinces a forgiving approach to the 
Rule, one that favors the continuation of lawsuits despite the reasoning of 
lower courts and the absence of various interested parties. 
In 2008 the Supreme Court decided Republic of the Philippines v. 
Pimentel,7 its first significant Rule 19 case in decades.  Pimentel arose out of 
litigation surrounding the brutal 1970s Marcos regime in the Philippines.  A 
litany of parties sought to claim more than $30 million that Marcos deposited 
in the United States through a shell corporation in 1972.8  Merrill Lynch, 
 
 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 
COLUM. L. REV. 1254, 1255 (1961). 
 2 Rule 19 is more commonly thought of as controlling joinder of “necessary” and “indispensable” 
parties, terms which appeared in the Rule prior to a series of changes in 2007, which replaced the word 
“necessary” with “required” and deleted the word “indispensable” altogether.  See infra notes 50–51 and 
accompanying text. 
 3 See FED. R. CIV. P. 19 advisory committee’s note on 1966 amendments (“Whenever feasible, the 
persons materially interested in the subject of an action . . . should be joined as parties so that they may be 
heard and a complete disposition made.”). 
 4 John W. Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions (pt. 1), 55 MICH. L. REV. 327, 330 
(1957). 
 5 390 U.S. 102 (1968). 
 6 498 U.S. 5 (1990) (per curiam). 
 7 128 S. Ct. 2180 (2008). 
 8 Id. at 2185–86. 
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which held the disputed assets, filed an interpleader action to settle ownership; 
two parties invoked sovereign immunity and subsequently moved for dismissal 
pursuant to Rule 19(b) for failure to join each as an indispensible party.9  The 
district and appellate courts each denied the 19(b) motions; the Supreme Court 
reversed.10 
Pimentel illuminated an oft-recurring problem emanating from a subset of 
Rule 19 decisions: the unintended expansion of sovereign immunity through 
the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the concurrent 
judicial distortion of Rule 19 and its goals as a result of strict adherence to 
unnecessarily rigid notions of sovereign protections. 
Sovereign immunity protects foreign states and state-related entities from 
the jurisdiction of other countries’ national courts.11  Sovereign immunity 
functions as a prophylactic, allowing a nation-state and its political 
subdivisions to engage in self-governance without concern for the looming 
threat of judicial accountability outside of their own court systems.12  It is 
designed both to encourage complete autonomous decision making by nation-
states and to evidence common respect for the domestic justice systems of 
foreign nations.13 
Although sovereign immunity immunizes sovereigns,14 recent judicial 
treatment of Rule 19 has expanded sovereign immunity such that its 
emanations often protect nonsovereign entities from suits in which they would 
otherwise face liability.15  At the same time, the involvement of sovereigns in 
Rule 19 cases stymies the effective application of the Rule, frustrating its 
overarching purpose and resulting in inequitable decisions that leave plaintiffs 
without recourse.  Pimentel, though not the first decision to grapple with 
sovereigns as indispensable parties, ultimately fails to resolve the conflict 
between immunity and compulsory joinder in any meaningful way.  It provides 
 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. at 2186–87, 2194. 
 11 Nat’l City Bank of N.Y. v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 362 (1955) (noting that foreign sovereign 
immunity derives “from standards of public morality, fair dealing, reciprocal self-interest, and respect for the 
‘power and dignity’ of the foreign sovereign”); GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL 
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 219 (4th ed. 2007). 
 12 THEODORE R. GIUTTARI, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 3 (1970). 
 13 See Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 688–89 (2004) (describing sovereign immunity as a mutual 
understanding between nations that domestic jurisdiction has certain limitations). 
 14 A sovereign is “[a] person, body, or state vested with independent and supreme authority.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1523 (9th ed. 2009). 
 15 See infra Part III. 
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inarticulate precedent and seems to sanction, rather than to rectify, the unjust 
outcomes wrought by the interplay of the Rule and sovereign immunity. 
This Comment argues that many of the modern trends that stymie effective 
justice in Rule 19 sovereign immunity cases are the same problems that 
plagued courts applying the early inchoate version of the compulsory joinder 
doctrine.  Just as judges of the early twentieth century became too focused on 
labels and formulae, tribunals of the twenty-first century forget the pragmatism 
Rule 19 demands.  Instead, courts systematically bow to unnecessarily strict 
applications of doctrinal preconceptions—such as the inviolability of sovereign 
immunity—to the detriment of the Federal Rules.  Modern judicial treatment 
of Rule 19 and sovereign immunity evidences a skewed balance that often 
sacrifices the seemingly valid and deserved rights of claimants upon the altar 
of judicial inflexibility with no cognizable benefit in return. 
This Comment proceeds in four parts.  Parts I and II discuss, in turn, the 
foundations of compulsory joinder and sovereign immunity, focusing on the 
justifications for and historical developments of each doctrine.  Part III 
explores the intersection of Rule 19 and sovereign immunity, both of foreign 
nation-states and tribal sovereigns, whose presence often plagues lower federal 
courts.  In particular, Part III explores the Supreme Court’s logic in Pimentel, 
which broadly (and unfortunately) reflects the approach usually taken by 
courts faced with the conflict of joining sovereigns.  It also explores select 
decisions of other federal courts both before and after Pimentel. 
Part IV argues that the solution to the seeming incompatibility in Rule 19 
jurisprudence lies in a steadfast return to form: a return to the responsive case-
by-case concerns that drove the modern reformulation of Rule 19.  Recalling 
the criticisms leveled at the ineffective early version of Rule 19, and the recent 
criticisms of the dissenters in Pimentel, modern courts must focus on case-
specific pragmatism when confronted with the facially incompatible 
requirements of Rule 19 and sovereign immunity.  Many of the suggested 
implementations of this pragmatism are patterned on areas of the law where 
Congress or the courts have already successfully abrogated immunity to 
effectuate joinder.  Conceding that a single holistic solution to the present 
problem is likely impossible, this Comment traces a number of possible 
responses for courts, legislatures, and parties to lawsuits.  Each response has its 
limitations, but all are part of an attempt to find creative solutions to problems 
that demand flexibility.  Anything less than a case-by-case attempt to rectify 
the status quo’s inadequacy risks closing the courthouse doors on aggrieved 
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plaintiffs—simultaneously inflating sovereign immunity while eviscerating the 
power and logic of compulsory joinder. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULE 19 JURISPRUDENCE 
Understanding the failings of the present-day Rule 19 jurisprudence 
requires evaluating the basis for compulsory joinder and its evolution in 
American law.  This Part traces the genesis of judicially imposed joinder 
through English and American legal traditions, including the eventual 
codification of scattered doctrines into Rule 19.  It then discusses the 
inadequacies of the Rule’s initial drafting and the subsequent movement to 
reform and refine the crumbling statutory approach.  It concludes with a 
discussion of the seminal pre-2008 Supreme Court decisions interpreting the 
workings of Rule 19. 
A. The Foundations of the Compulsory Joinder Doctrine 
The doctrine of compulsory joinder, which seeks to ensure that parties with 
a substantial stake in the outcome of litigation are represented therein, predates 
the conceptual merger of suits in law and equity.16  The early joinder 
mechanisms reflected an attempt to distinguish between parties with and 
without measurable interests in a proceeding.17  Compulsory joinder evolved 
from the foundational idea that a “‘Court of Equity, in all cases, delights to do 
complete justice, and not by halves’; to put an end to litigation, and to give 
decrees of such a nature, that the performance of them may be perfectly safe to 
all who obey them.”18 
The initially broad and abstract rationales for compulsory joinder coalesced 
into two doctrinal justifications, which together spurred the later evolution of 
rule-based joinder jurisprudence.  First, no one should be held to an outcome if 
not present for—and represented in—the litigation.  Second, a court should “do 
complete justice.”19 
The first motivation is overwhelmingly one of fairness.  It undermines any 
common understanding of the law to say that a court can or should make 
 
 16 For an in-depth examination of the history of joinder, see Reed, supra note 4. 
 17 Id. at 330–31. 
 18 Id. at 332 (quoting CHRISTOPHER ALDERSON CALVERT, PARTIES TO SUITS IN EQUITY 2 (2d ed. 1847)). 
 19 Id. at 331–32 (quoting CALVERT, supra note 18, at 2). 
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decisions that significantly imperil the interests of nonpresent parties.20  The 
second justification for compulsory joinder speaks to a universal interest in 
making sure that court decisions are, in fact, decisive.21  It is not hard to 
imagine the uncertainty engendered by a judicial system unable to resolve 
disputes to finality.  Far from being dispensaries of justice, courts would be 
little more than glorified sounding boards for the aggrieved, robbed of the 
ability to effectively put to rest disputes upon the facts presented.  Ensuring the 
availability of an effective judiciary is thus one of the primary goals informing 
a joinder doctrine that allows (and sometimes compels) courts to override the 
plaintiff’s party structure or to dismiss an action. 
B. Compulsory Joinder in the United States Prior to Rule 19 
Although inchoate compulsory joinder formulations appeared to varying 
degrees in English common law and early Supreme Court decisions,22 the 
doctrine took definite form in America during the nineteenth century with the 
categorical delineation of parties based on levels of interest and 
indispensability.23  Central to the creation of labeled-party classes was Shields 
v. Barrow.24  Shields, which prescribed for the first time contours of 
“necessary” and “indispensable” parties, is the most influential case in early 
American compulsory joinder jurisprudence.25 
Unhappy with the payment scheme agreed upon to sell his plantation, 
Robert Barrow filed suit against two Mississippi citizens in federal circuit 
court in Louisiana.26  Six people signed the various financial instruments 
associated with the sale; four were Louisiana citizens whose joinder would 
have defeated the suit’s complete diversity basis of jurisdiction.27  Barrow 
 
 20 Professor Reed discusses this question in some detail and particularly focuses on whether a court may 
exercise the power of joinder without having “jurisdiction” over a party.  See id. at 332–34 (critiquing reliance 
on “jurisdictional” arguments couched in terms of joinder). 
 21 See supra text accompanying note 18. 
 22 Reed, supra note 4, at 347–51 (stating that “[t]he Court in Shields v. Barrow had a body of authority 
on which to build,” and tracing Supreme Court cases).  See generally Hazard, supra note 1 (tracing the 
doctrine through English and early American law). 
 23 See Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Reed, supra note 4, at 340. 
 26 Shields, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 137. 
 27 Id. at 139; see also Reed, supra note 4, at 341–42 (summarizing the facts of Shields v. Barrow and 
noting that joinder of the Louisiana citizens “would have ousted jurisdiction under the ‘complete diversity’ 
doctrine”).  The Constitution permits federal courts to adjudicate, among other things, 
“Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States.”  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  As currently codified 
and interpreted, this “diversity jurisdiction” requires “complete diversity”—no plaintiff can be a citizen of the 
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never joined the Louisiana signatories—only suing the Mississippi 
signatories—and the case proceeded to a circuit court decree with only 
Mississippi defendants represented.28  The Supreme Court reversed,29 holding 
that the circuit court could not make any decree upon the instrument because 
doing so would necessarily imperil the rights of absent indispensable parties.30 
In language that would later form the building blocks of Rule 19, Justice 
Curtis defined indispensable parties as those having an interest “of such a 
nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest, 
or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final termination may be 
wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.”31  By contrast, the 
Court defined necessary parties as persons having an interest “who ought to be 
made parties” to afford “complete justice.”32  The distinction between 
necessary and indispensable parties was the former’s ability to separate their 
interests from those of the parties to the action “so that the court [could] . . . do 
complete and final justice, without affecting other persons not before the 
court.”33  That is, the interests of absent indispensable parties, as opposed to 
those of parties that were merely necessary, could not be separated from those 
of parties to the action.  This reality justified prioritizing the indispensable 
parties’ rights over those of parties already present.  This justification is the 
foundational idea of Rule 19. 
Shields “embed[ded] in American procedural law the now familiar division 
of required parties into categories.”34  More than a century after Shields, the 
Court’s language—defining as necessary those parties who ought to be present 
 
same state as any defendant.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 
(1806).  See generally RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 160–95 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing the history of 
diversity jurisdiction and its modern strictures).  Thus, a plaintiff’s decision to include only certain parties at 
the outset is often a strategic choice to satisfy jurisdictional prerequisites.  Subsequent joinder of other parties, 
then, can threaten diversity jurisdiction: if a court orders joinder of a party whose presence defeats complete 
diversity, that federal court will forfeit jurisdiction over the controversy.  The initial form of the Rule, in fact, 
directed courts to evaluate whether joinder would defeat the jurisdiction the court already held over the parties 
present.  FED. R. CIV. P. 19 advisory committee’s note on 1966 amendments; see also Calcote v. Tex. Pac. 
Coal & Oil Co., 157 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1946) (“In diversity cases, the question of indispensable parties is 
inherent in the issue of federal jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 28 Shields, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 142. 
 29 Id. at 139 (“Such being the scope of this bill and its parties, it is perfectly clear that the circuit 
court . . . could not make any decree thereon.”). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Reed, supra note 4, at 355.  The “now familiar division” is that created by Rule 19. 
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in the suit, and as indispensable those parties whose interest precludes a 
complete resolution of the dispute—would reappear nearly verbatim in the 
major 1966 reformulation of Rule 19.35 
C. The Formation and Textual Evolution of Rule 19 Prior to 1966 
Before the emergence of Rule 19, the common law capitalized upon 
Shields’s labels in an attempt to force the timely disposition of cases, which 
resulted in courts cabining cases into staid categories with little regard for the 
unique facts of each dispute.  It was an unfortunate “jurisprudence of labels,” 
through which courts “tended to seize upon notions of ‘separate’ or ‘joint’ 
interests and concluded that a rigid class of absentees . . . could always be 
deemed ‘indispensable.’”36  This common law system of joinder persisted until 
the emergence of a textual Rule in the early twentieth century. 
The Rules Advisory Committee promulgated the original version of Rule 
1937 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, functionally codifying the 
Shields-era focus on labels and semantic distinctions.38  Accordingly, the first 
version of Rule 19 did little to stem the tide of inequitable decisions flowing 
from Shields and its progeny.39 
Like the disjointed common law it reified, the early Rule proved wholly 
“inflexible” in practice because it continued to encourage judges to force 
categorization of parties, rather than to evaluate and adjudicate the particulars 
of each dispute.40  The Rule was rife with textual failings, which “directed 
attention to the technical or abstract character of the rights or obligations of the 
persons whose joinder was in question, and correspondingly distracted 
 
 35 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  Rule 19(b) asks whether in “equity and good conscience” 
an action can continue absent a necessary party. 
 36 Richard D. Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to Restructure Federal Rule 19, 60 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061, 1075–76 (1985) (quoting C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 70, at 458 (4th 
ed. 1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 37 The text of original Rule 19 can be found at 308 U.S. 687 (1938). 
 38 FREER, supra note 27, at 649; see also Hazard, supra note 1, at 1254 n.4 (discussing the codification of 
necessary and indispensable parties in early Rule 19 and state codes); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of 
the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (pt. 1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 
363 (1967) (“Rule 19, as adopted in 1938 . . . , did not avoid the defects and frustrations of the courts’ 
treatment of the required joinder problem during the previous century.”).  For more on the original version of 
Rule 19, see Freer, supra note 36, at 1076 & n.72. 
 39 See Freer, supra note 36, at 1076; Kaplan, supra note 38, at 363 (“[T]here was little in [the original 
Rule’s] language or mood positively to induce the courts to change their indurated habits.”). 
 40 FREER, supra note 27, at 649.  For a discussion of the criticisms leveled at post-Shields decisions 
generally, see Reed, supra note 4, at 327. 
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attention from the pragmatic considerations which should be controlling.”41  It 
was, in short, a rule that led to strict formulaic and unfair outcomes rather than 
workable, case-by-case decisions sufficiently considerate of the facts before 
the court.42 
Thirty years after Rule 19 first emerged, the Advisory Committee 
concluded that courts and commentators understood the theoretical doctrine of 
compulsory joinder, but that the Rule as drafted was “defective in its phrasing 
and did not point clearly to the proper basis of decision,”43 adding that: 
In some instances courts did not undertake the relevant inquiry or 
were misled by the “jurisdiction” fallacy.  In other instances there 
was undue preoccupation with abstract classifications of rights or 
obligations, as against consideration of the particular consequences of 
proceeding with the action and the ways by which these 
consequences might be ameliorated by the shaping of final relief or 
other precautions.44 
The Advisory Committee thus substantially revised Rule 19 in 1966.45  The 
stated goal was to clarify the Rule in a way that would consistently effectuate 
the goals of compulsory joinder46 by “stat[ing] affirmatively what factors [are] 
relevant in deciding whether the action should proceed or be dismissed when 
joinder of interested persons [is] infeasible.”47  In doing so, the revision 
established for the first time factors by which a court could evaluate whether to 
compel joinder or, when necessary, dismiss a case because of a party’s 
absence.48 
 
 41 FED. R. CIV. P. 19 advisory committee’s note on 1966 amendments (emphasis added). 
 42 See id.  Many cases referred to indispensable parties under early Rule 19 as parties who would have 
been indispensable prior to the rules, invoking the common law to supplement the inarticulate rules.  See, e.g., 
Chidester v. City of Newark, 162 F.2d 598, 600 (3d Cir. 1947) (“[I]ndispensable parties under Rule 19 are 
those who were indispensable prior to the rules . . . .”). 
 43 FED. R. CIV. P. 19 advisory committee’s note on 1966 amendments (discussing “Defects in the 
Original Rule”). 
 44 Id. 
 45 See id. 
 46 See supra text accompanying note 18. 
 47 FED. R. CIV. P. 19 advisory committee’s note on 1966 amendments. 
 48 Courts saw the purpose of the change almost immediately: “The new Rule 19 is designed to ameliorate 
the catechistic distinction between ‘necessary’ and ‘indispensable’ parties, which had sometimes subordinated 
logic and reality to historical encrustations.”  Broussard v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 398 F.2d 885, 
888 (5th Cir. 1968). 
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D. Rule 19 in the Present Day 
Since 1966, Rule 19 has remained starkly unchanged.  The Advisory 
Committee has amended it only twice: in 1987 and in 2007.  The 1987 
amendments were “technical” only.49  In 2007, the Advisory Committee made 
“stylistic”50 changes to Rule 19, notably removing the term “indispensable,” 
which it considered “redundant.”51 
Thus, following minor revisions throughout the past half-century, the 
current form of Rule 19 reads, in relevant part52: 
Rule 19. Required Joinder of Parties 
(a) Persons Required to Be Joined if Feasible. 
(1) Required Party. A person who is subject to service of process and 
whose joinder will not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be 
joined as a party if: 
(A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among 
existing parties; or 
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is 
so situated that disposing of the action in the person’s absence may: 
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect 
the interest; or 
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring 
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest. 
(2) Joinder by Court Order. If a person has not been joined as required, 
the court must order that the person be made a party.  A person who refuses to 
join as a plaintiff may be made either a defendant or, in a proper case, an 
involuntary plaintiff. 
(3) Venue. If a joined party objects to venue and the joinder would make 
venue improper, the court must dismiss that party. 
 
 49 See FED. R. CIV. P. 19 advisory committee’s note on 1987 amendments (“No substantive change is 
intended.”). 
 50 Id. on 2007 amendments (“The language of Rule 19 has been amended as part of the general restyling 
of the Civil Rules . . . .  These changes are intended to be stylistic only.”); see also Reed, supra note 4, at 328 
(discussing in detail the historical semantic problem of choosing between “necessary,” “indispensable,” 
“insistible,” “substantial,” and more). 
 51 The Supreme Court in Pimentel agreed, saying that the substitution of the word “required” for 
“necessary” and the deletion of the word “indispensable” serves only to simplify and clarify the operation of 
the prior rule.  Philippines v. Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. 2180, 2184 (2008). 
 52 Because this Comment focuses exclusively on subdivisions (a) and (b) of Rule 19, subsections (c) and 
(d) have been omitted. 
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(b) When Joinder Is Not Feasible. If a person who is required to be joined 
if feasible cannot be joined, the court must determine whether, in equity and 
good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or 
should be dismissed.  The factors for the court to consider include: 
(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might 
prejudice that person or the existing parties; 
(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by: 
(A) protective provisions in the judgment; 
(B) shaping the relief; or 
(C) other measures; 
(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence would be 
adequate; and 
(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were 
dismissed for nonjoinder. 
E. Supreme Court Rule 19 Jurisprudence from 1966 to 2008: Exploring the 
Foundational Cases 
Since the creation of modern Rule 19 in 1966, the Supreme Court has 
addressed the Rule’s substantive workings and its multifactor test only a 
handful of times, most notably in two decisions: Provident Tradesmens Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Patterson53 and, twenty-two years later, Temple v. Synthes 
Corp.54 
Provident Tradesmens involved a suit over a traffic accident.55  The 
Tradesmens Bank, acting as administrator for multiple estates, sued the estate 
of one vehicle’s driver.56  The bank did not, however, sue the owner of the 
automobile involved in the accident,57 because his presence would have 
defeated the complete diversity upon which it predicated jurisdiction.58  The 
lower courts dismissed, calling the automobile owner an indispensable party.59  
 
 53 390 U.S. 102 (1968). 
 54 498 U.S. 5 (1990) (per curiam). 
 55 Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 104. 
 56 Id. 
 57 The automobile was owned by Edward Dutcher (who was not present when the accident occurred) and 
was being driven by Donald Cionci, who died in the crash.  Id. 
 58 Id. at 105.  Failure to initially join a party is often the result of a calculated decision to satisfy 
jurisdictional prerequisites.  See, e.g., supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 59 Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 106. 
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The Supreme Court reversed, conceding that the absent party should have been 
joined if feasible under 19(a) and focusing its analysis on the 19(b) factors.60 
Warning against the use of rigid Rule 19 formulae, the Court highlighted 
the fact that, while the plaintiff had an appreciable interest in a particular 
forum, the defendant likewise wished to avoid duplicative litigation, 
inconsistent relief, or sole responsibility for liability that should be shared.61  
Such a dualism—with cognizable interests in favor of both the plaintiff and 
defendant—typified a situation demanding the pragmatism stressed by the 
Advisory Committee62 in reformulating Rule 19.  The Court similarly extolled 
the Rule’s pragmatism, stating: “[Rule 19’s factors] must be examined in each 
case to determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the court should 
proceed without a party whose absence from the litigation is compelled.”63 
The plaintiff’s general interest, which the Supreme Court found 
compelling,64 flows from the foundational idea that the plaintiff chooses the 
forum and parties to the lawsuit so that he gets the relief to which he is 
entitled.65  The Court reasoned that allowing the case to proceed would best 
serve the interests of “complete, consistent, and efficient settlement of 
controversies.”66  Balancing the Rule 19 factors in light of the particulars of the 
case, the Court denied the motion to dismiss and allowed the case to continue, 
despite the absence of the automobile owner.67 
Provident Tradesmens is important because it heralded the Supreme 
Court’s first consideration of the newly amended—and purportedly more 
responsive and flexible—Rule 19.  Provident Tradesmens highlighted the 
importance of the new Rule’s pragmatic case-by-case approach, with the Court 
stressing the changes: “Where the new version emphasizes the pragmatic 
consideration of the effects of the alternatives of proceeding or dismissing, the 
 
 60 Id. at 108.  “We may assume, at the outset, that [the automobile owner] falls within the category of 
persons who, under § (a), should be ‘joined if feasible.’ . . .  Hence the problem was the one to which Rule 
19 (b) appears to address itself . . . .”  Id. at 108–09. 
 61 Id. at 109–10. 
 62 See FED. R. CIV. P. 19 advisory committee’s note on 1966 amendments (“[T]he case should be 
examined pragmatically . . . .”). 
 63 Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 109 (emphases added). 
 64 Id. at 112 (“[The plaintiff’s] interest in preserving a fully litigated judgment should be overborne only 
by rather greater opposing considerations . . . .  Opposing considerations in this case are hard to find.”). 
 65 See Reed, supra note 4, at 327 (“The plaintiff in a civil cause ordinarily is permitted to select the 
persons with whom he will litigate.”). 
 66 Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 111. 
 67 See id. at 112. 
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older version tended to emphasize classification of parties . . . .”68  At the same 
time, the decision remains one of the few instances in which the Supreme 
Court explained in any great detail the workings of either 19(a), which controls 
the classification of necessary parties, or 19(b), which controls whether the 
necessary parties rise to the level of indispensable parties, whose presence is 
crucial for the continuation of the lawsuit.  Simply by virtue of being the 
Supreme Court’s first and most complete statement on the operation of Rule 
19, Provident Tradesmens remains the most authoritative precedent on 
compulsory joinder, even a half-century after its disposition.69 
The next landmark Rule 19 adjudication did not emerge until 1990, when 
the Court decided Temple v. Synthes Corp.70—a brief opinion that again 
reversed a lower court’s 19(b) dismissal.71  Temple, a Mississippi resident, 
suffered medical complications when a spinal device manufactured by the 
Synthes Corporation broke apart in his back.72  Temple sued Synthes, which 
moved to dismiss pursuant to 19(b) for failure to join the doctor and the 
hospital associated with the procedure.73  The district court ordered Temple to 
join these parties and, upon his failure to do so, dismissed the case with 
prejudice.74  Temple appealed and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed.75  The court of appeals held that it would be prejudicial to Synthes to 
defend against multiple lawsuits, especially since the corporation’s defense 
might be negligence on the part of the physicians and hospital staff.76 
The Supreme Court reversed, saying that joint tortfeasors do not qualify as 
parties who “should be ‘joined if feasible’” under 19(a).77  Stated another way, 
borrowing the familiar terminology of Rule 19, the Court held that joint 
tortfeasors do not, by virtue of that connection alone, rise to the level of 
necessary parties.78  Finding that the Advisory Committee had not intended to 
change the status quo categorization of joint tortfeasors as solely permissive 
 
 68 Id. at 117 n.12. 
 69 The Pimentel Court, for example, cited to Provident Tradesmens repeatedly for various issues of law.  
See Philippines v. Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. 2180, 2188 (2008). 
 70 498 U.S. 5 (1990) (per curiam). 
 71 Id. at 8. 
 72 Id. at 5–6. 
 73 Id. at 6. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. (citing Temple v. Synthes Corp., 898 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1990)). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 7–8 (quoting Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 108 (1968)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
 78 Id. 
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parties, the Court allowed the underlying case to proceed without ever having 
to make a 19(b) inquiry.79  Temple is authority for the notion that the threshold 
question of 19(a) is a necessary prerequisite to finding 19(b) indispensability.80  
It does not, however, provide any substantial guidance as to the balancing of 
equities under 19(b)’s four factors, making Provident Tradesmens still the 
most informative Supreme Court case on that question. 
Taken together, Temple and Provident Tradesmens are notable because 
each involved the Court reversing a lower court’s dismissal—limiting the 
effectiveness of 19(b) as a tool to eject cases from the courtroom.  These 
decisions provide a picture of Supreme Court jurisprudence that favors 
circumscribing the gamut of situations in which a plaintiff’s failure to add a 
party closes the courthouse doors.  The framework evidenced by the Court is 
one of pragmatic fairness, a framework by which its two seminal Rule 19 cases 
eschewed dismissal, despite the findings of the lower courts.  These decisions 
exhibit a marked intent to ensure that plaintiffs are not exorcised from the 
docket unless a reasonable alternative forum for relief is evident and 
available.81 
Although the Supreme Court has periodically addressed tangential issues 
relating to the application of the Rule,82 Provident Tradesmens and Temple are 
the foundational decisions of the 19(a) and 19(b) factors post-1966.  Against 
that background, the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Republic of the 
Philippines v. Pimentel was of particular import to the continued development 
of consistent Rule 19 jurisprudence.  Pimentel, couched in a Rule 19 motion 
seeking to join sovereign parties, resulted in a landmark shift away from the 
evidently liberal reading of the past.  The decision highlighted—at the highest 
level—a contentious area of Rule 19 jurisprudence that defies the pragmatism 
of the Provident Tradesmens decades: the invocation of sovereign immunity 
by otherwise necessary and indispensable parties. 
 
 79 Id. at 7. 
 80 Id. at 8 (“Here, no inquiry under Rule 19(b) is necessary, because the threshold requirements of Rule 
19(a) have not been satisfied.”). 
 81 See Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 109 n.3 (discussing the prominence of Rule 19(b)’s fourth 
factor). 
 82 See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (discussing the preclusive effect of Rule 19 in cases of 
intervention). 
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
The development of sovereign immunity in American law largely mimics 
that of joinder—originating as a common law doctrine and evolving into a 
statutory scheme.  This Part traces the emergence and particularities of both 
foreign and tribal sovereign immunity in the American legal system.  It 
concludes with a discussion of the mechanics of invoking sovereign immunity 
in federal courts. 
A. The Foundations of Foreign Sovereign Immunity in American Courts 
Foreign sovereign immunity precludes bringing suit against a foreign 
government without its consent.83  Sovereign immunity in American courts 
initially surfaced during the nineteenth century to protect governments that 
were, at the time, engaged almost exclusively in traditional political 
activities.84  The Supreme Court explicated the role of the judiciary in the face 
of sovereign immunity in its 1812 decision, Schooner Exchange v. 
McFaddon,85 the first such recognition of the confines of the doctrine in 
American courts.86 
Schooner Exchange dealt with an American citizen attempting to claim title 
to a French vessel moored in territorial waters for repair.87  The Court found 
that the vessel, which was “in the service of a [peaceful] foreign 
sovereign[,] . . . must be considered as having come into the American 
territory, under an implied promise, that while necessarily within it, and 
demeaning herself in a friendly manner, she should be exempt from the 
jurisdiction of the country.”88 
The logic for recognizing common law foreign sovereign immunity, 
explained Justice Marshall, flows from the mutual acknowledgment among 
nations of their shared absolute inviolability and the concomitant dignity 
fostered by respecting their individual boundaries: 
The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal 
rights and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by 
 
 83 Margot C. Wuebbels, Note, Commercial Terrorism: A Commercial Activity Exception Under 
§ 1605(a)(2) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 1123, 1124 (1993). 
 84 GIUTTARI, supra note 12, at 3. 
 85 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
 86 Wuebbels, supra note 83, at 1124. 
 87 Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 122, 135. 
 88 Id. at 147. 
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intercourse with each other, and by an interchange of those good 
offices which humanity dictates and its wants require, all sovereigns 
have consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases under certain 
peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and complete jurisdiction 
within their respective territories which sovereignty confers.89 
The protection of governments qua political bodies heralded an era of 
complete—or “absolute”90—immunity in American courts that shielded 
virtually any action of a sovereign from judicial scrutiny by other nations.91  
Absolute immunity, practiced primarily by the United States and the United 
Kingdom, stood in contrast to the less rigid form of “restrictive” immunity 
recognized by other European nations at the time.92 
Because sovereign immunity “is a matter of grace and comity rather than a 
constitutional requirement,” nations have the ability to circumscribe it as 
necessary or desired.93  Accordingly, the subsequent proliferation of 
government entities into otherwise private affairs throughout the nineteenth 
century94 necessitated exceptions to comprehensive sovereign immunity for 
foreign nations in American tribunals.95 
B. Modern Foreign Sovereign Immunity in America Since 1950 
World War II served as the catalyst for changing the absolutist nature of 
American sovereign immunity: “After [WWII] . . . the growing role of state 
agencies in international trade led to the re-examination of” absolute 
immunity.96  The spread of the state into private realms precipitated the “Tate 
letter” of May 1952, which aligned American immunity with the more limited 
form found in Europe.97  The Tate letter announced that the State Department 
 
 89 Id. at 136. 
 90 Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in Perspective: A 
Founder’s View, 35 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 302, 302 (1986). 
 91 GIUTTARI, supra note 12, at 3. 
 92 Feldman, supra note 90, at 303. 
 93 Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689 (2004). 
 94 “[Nations] began to compete in many instances directly with private parties in a variety of fields such 
as shipping, foreign trade, banking, mining and other commercial areas . . . .”  GIUTTARI, supra note 12, at 3. 
 95 See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (2006)); Altmann, 541 U.S. at 691 (“[T]he Act carves out certain exceptions to 
its general grant of immunity . . . .”). 
 96 Feldman, supra note 90, at 303. 
 97 Id.  At that time, questions of sovereign immunity fell within the purview of the State Department, to 
whom sovereigns would petition to avoid the jurisdiction of the courts.  The State Department disavowed itself 
of this power and transferred questions of sovereignty to the courts in the 1960s.  Id. at 303–04. 
ANDRE GALLEYSFINAL 6/7/2011  8:29 AM 
2011] COMPULSORY [MIS]JOINDER 1175 
was carving exceptions to the otherwise absolute cloak of sovereignty, no 
longer “request[ing] immunity in all actions against friendly foreign 
sovereigns.”98  The resultant version of American sovereign immunity—and 
indeed that employed in all nations except some socialist regimes and a 
handful of third world countries—is the “restrictive theory” of immunity.99 
The restrictive theory excluded from judicial amnesty a nation’s “private 
acts,”100 originally defined as “acts of industrial, commercial, financial, or any 
other business enterprises in which private persons may engage, or an act 
connected with such an enterprise.”101  Such acts stood in contrast to “public 
acts,”102 or “those acts arising from internal administrative acts of a 
government, legislative acts, acts involving armed forces, acts involving 
diplomatic activity, and public loans,” which continued to enjoy deserved 
protections.103 
The Tate letter did little to articulate clear guidelines for distinguishing 
between private and public acts.104  As such, the State Department continued to 
make case-by-case determinations with “no clear standards governing [its] 
decisions.”105  Courts likewise struggled to understand the requirements of the 
Tate letter, causing divergence between the two branches.106  This regime of 
imprecise standards continued largely unabated until the codification of this 
restrictive theory in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) in 1976.107 
The departure from absolute immunity reflects “not only the diverse 
character of the modern State and the demands of the international economy, 
but also the demystification of the State as a supreme being above the ordinary 
procedures of justice and accountability.”108  The fundamental tenet of the 
restrictive theory of immunity is that immunity is not absolute for the myriad 
activities in which a state partakes that are “private” as opposed to “sovereign,” 
 
 98 Wuebbels, supra note 83, at 1125. 
 99 Feldman, supra note 90, at 302. 
 100 Wuebbels, supra note 83, at 1125 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 1125–26. 
 107 Id. at 1126 (“The indecision and ambiguities presented by this divergent application in cases involving 
foreign sovereigns made the enactment of the [FSIA] timely. . . .  The [FSIA] codifies the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity.”). 
 108 Feldman, supra note 90, at 302. 
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such as commercial dealings with private parties.109  Restrictive immunity is 
thus an attempt to recapture the original logic of sovereign immunity—
protecting governing bodies as such—in the face of the increasing 
encroachment of sovereigns in the private realm.110 
The restrictive theory remains, however, only a way of carving exceptions 
to the general grant of complete immunity.111  Section 1604 of the FSIA 
provides that “a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States and of the States,”112 and proceeds to define 
exceptions in subsequent sections.113  Courts conclude the same: “The FSIA 
creates a statutory presumption that a foreign state is immune from suit unless 
one of the exceptions to immunity enumerated in [the FSIA] applies.”114  
Accordingly, unless a sovereign’s actions fit into a set of carefully defined 
exceptions, the sovereign will generally have complete immunity from the 
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, insofar as its actions are still 
public in the traditional sense.115 
C. Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
Indian116 tribes have been viewed as sovereigns since the European 
discovery of America.117  The notion that tribes enjoy unique legal status is 
evident in the Constitution: “[T]he Commerce Clause of Article I indicates that 
Indian tribes are in some material sense comparable to foreign nations and the 
 
 109 BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 11, at 221. 
 110 See supra notes 84, 94, and accompanying text. 
 111 See Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 691 (2004) (“These exceptions are central to the [FSIA’s] 
functioning . . . .”).  See generally Feldman, supra note 90 (discussing trends in the evolution of sovereign 
immunity). 
 112 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006). 
 113 Id. §§ 1605–1611. 
 114 Randolph v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 97 F.3d 319, 324 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). 
 115 See 28 U.S.C. § 1604.  For further discussion of the history of sovereign immunity and its 
development in the FSIA and beyond, see Kevin M. Whiteley, Note, Holding International Organizations 
Accountable Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Civil Actions Against the United Nations for Non-
Commercial Torts, 7 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 619, 621–26 (2008). 
 116 This Comment uses the term Indian to refer to American Indian Tribes, also known as Native 
Americans.  It does so without pretext or judgment as to which combination of terms is most politically 
appropriate.  See Joel Bleifuss, A Politically Correct Lexicon: Your ‘How-To’ Guide to Avoid Offending 
Anyone, IN THESE TIMES, Feb. 2007, at 36, 37, available at http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/3027/ 
(“Indians either use their specific tribal name or use Indian . . . .  You use the qualifier American when you 
need to distinguish from Indian Indians.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 117 Nicholas V. Merkley, Note, Compulsory Party Joinder and Tribal Sovereign Immunity: A Proposal to 
Modify Federal Courts’ Application of Rule 19 to Cases Involving Absent Tribes as “Necessary” Parties, 56 
OKLA. L. REV. 931, 940 (2003). 
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states,”118 and the Fourteenth Amendment specifically excludes from 
apportionment “Indians not taxed.”119  The unique legal status of tribes, “which 
no other group, racial or otherwise, can claim,”120 suggests that tribes enjoy 
certain protections—e.g., judicial immunity—not available to other domestic 
actors. 
That tribes are immune from suit in the nation’s courts has been historically 
recognized and protected by the Supreme Court.121  A suite of early Supreme 
Court decisions, known as “The Marshall Trilogy,” laid the framework for 
“acknowledging and defining basic tribal sovereignty as a matter of federal 
law,”122 and courts further refined the contours of tribal sovereignty throughout 
the nineteenth century.123  As Professor Andrea Seielstad concludes, “What 
these early cases demonstrate is that the federal government has long 
recognized and respected what amounts to tribal immunity from suit even if 
the Supreme Court did not name the doctrine in so many words until 1940.”124  
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court finally named, 
clarified, and cemented tribal sovereign immunity.125 
In many ways, the current form of tribal sovereign immunity eclipses the 
protections afforded to foreign sovereigns.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
recognized that “an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has 
authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.”126  The tribes’ 
sovereignty is not confined to the boundaries of the tribal reservation, nor is it 
limited to the restrictive theory used for foreign nations: “[T]he doctrine has 
been upheld whether the challenged tribal activity involved commercial or 
governmental actions by the tribe.”127  So long as an Indian tribe is federally 
 
 118 Scott C. Idleman, Multiculturalism and the Future of Tribal Sovereignty, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 589, 610 (2004); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power to “regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”). 
 119 Idleman, supra note 118, at 610 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 120 Id. (quoting Livingston v. Ewing, 455 F. Supp. 825, 831 (D.N.M. 1978), aff’d, 601 F.2d 1110 (10th 
Cir. 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 121 Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under Federal 
Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 
37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 678 (2002). 
 122 Id. at 689. 
 123 Id. at 686–99. 
 124 Id. at 694. 
 125 Id. at 694–99. 
 126 Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998) (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Seielstad, supra note 121, at 699 (collecting cases). 
 127 Seielstad, supra note 121, at 699. 
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recognized, it enjoys the protections of sovereign immunity barring any 
express abrogation by Congress or clear waiver by the tribe.128 
D. Invocations of Sovereign Immunity in Lawsuits 
Often when sovereigns face suit in the United States, the defendant is only 
a single sovereign or a contingent comprised exclusively of sovereign parties.  
In NYSA–ILA Pension Trust Fund v. Garuda Indonesia, for example, trustees 
of a pension fund sued the national airline of Indonesia and a number of 
Indonesia’s national banks to collect withdrawal liability from an Indonesian 
state-owned corporation.129  The district court determined that each defendant 
qualified as a “foreign state” under the FSIA130 and granted summary judgment 
for the defendants;131 the court of appeals affirmed.132  Similarly, in Murphy v. 
Korea Asset Management Corp., investors sued a state-financed Korean 
corporation alleging conspiracy in purchasing debtor assets.133  The court 
found that the state-backed corporation qualified as a foreign organ subject to 
FSIA protections and, as each defendant was a sovereign, dismissed the 
case.134 
The difficulty manifest in cases where Rule 19 and sovereign immunity 
interact, as compared to the cases discussed above, is the presence of both 
sovereign and nonsovereign entities as commingled parties on one side of an 
action—that is, where the defendants in a suit include both sovereigns and 
nonsovereigns.  In such a case, while a sovereign can invoke and enjoy the 
protections afforded to it by immunity, nonsovereigns remain liable to suit 
even after the sovereign’s dismissal—unless the sovereign qualifies as an 
indispensable Rule 19(b) party.  If the sovereign does meet the Rule 19(b) 
criteria, courts increasingly struggle to properly control the intersection of the 
doctrines. 
III. THE INTERSECTION OF RULE 19 AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
The invocation of sovereign immunity in a case fraught with compulsory 
joinder problems presents a set of dueling concerns for courts: to effectuate 
 
 128 Id. at 700. 
 129 7 F.3d 35, 36–37 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 130 See 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (2006) (defining “foreign state” for purposes of the FSIA). 
 131 NYSA–ILA Pension Trust Fund, 7 F.3d at 38. 
 132 Id. at 40. 
 133 421 F. Supp. 2d 627, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 190 F. App’x 43 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 134 Id. at 649. 
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joinder and, correspondingly, do complete justice, while addressing the 
countervailing jurisdictional problems posed by sovereignty.  The impasse 
demands a response more nuanced than simply dismissing the sovereign, as 
courts are wont to do in cases with only a single sovereign defendant, or even 
in cases with sovereigns joined in an action but not essential to its 
disposition.135  Instead, the analysis demanded by Rule 19 often declares a 
proper sovereign to be an indispensible party whose joinder is not feasible, and 
as a result, courts dismiss the entire action.  This trend culminated in the 
Supreme Court’s 2008 decision Republic of the Philippines v. Pimentel.136  
This Part begins with an analysis of the facts, holding, and dissent in Pimentel.  
It continues with a discussion of select federal court cases challenging actions 
by tribal sovereigns in which the problems evident in Pimentel reappear. 
A. Republic of the Philippines v. Pimentel 
In 2008, the Supreme Court decided its first case in almost thirty years 
concerning the direct application of Rule 19(b): Republic of the Philippines v. 
Pimentel.  In contrast to both Provident Tradesmens and Temple,137 which 
dealt with appeals in which the lower courts had granted a Rule 19 dismissal, 
Pimentel presented to the Court a case in which lower courts denied a 19(b) 
motion to dismiss.  And, whereas the balancing espoused in Provident 
Tradesmens and Temple may have suggested that the Supreme Court would 
affirm and allow the case to continue, it reversed and dismissed the proceeding 
instead. 
1. Facts and Background 
Ferdinand Marcos was elected president of the Philippines in 1965 and 
again in 1969.138  On September 21, 1972, just before the conclusion of his 
second term (the last allowable under Philippine law), Marcos declared martial 
law and suspended the constitution to maintain his reign.139  After instituting a 
 
 135 That is, sovereigns who meet the Rule 19(a) factors (required) but not the Rule 19(b) factors 
(indispensable).  See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)–(b). 
 136 128 S. Ct. 2180 (2008). 
 137 See supra Part I.E (explaining the general trend suggested by Provident Tradesmens and Temple). 
 138 In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1462 (D. Haw. 1995). 
 139 Id.  The stated purpose of Marcos’s proclamation was “to maintain law and order throughout the 
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and 
to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by [Marcos] personally or 
upon [Marcos’s] direction.”  Id. (quoting Narrative Statement of Reverend Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., In re Estate 
of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. 1460 (No. MDL 840)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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new constitution, tailor-made to cement his power, Marcos held the Philippines 
in a virtual dictatorship and sanctioned countless acts of “torture, summary 
execution, disappearance, arbitrary detention, and numerous other 
atrocities.”140 
In 1972, as his grab for dictatorial power began, Marcos incorporated 
Arelma, S.A. pursuant to Panamanian law141 as a corporate front for the wealth 
he amassed as president.142  Shortly thereafter, Arelma deposited $2 million in 
a brokerage account administered by Merrill Lynch in New York.143 
Marcos’s brutal regime continued until 1986, when he and his family fled 
the Philippines for Hawaii.144  In the mid-1990s, in response to the alleged 
atrocities of the Marcos regime, aggrieved citizens instituted a class action 
lawsuit145 on behalf of 9,539 human rights victims against Marcos, his 
estate,146 and others.  After protracted litigation, the class won almost $2 
billion.147  In an attempt to satisfy that judgment, the Pimentel class sought to 
attach the Arelma assets held by Merrill,148 which had grown to almost $35 
million.149 
Separate from the Pimentel litigation, the Philippine Presidential 
Commission on Good Governance (the Commission), specifically created to 
settle outstanding claims to Marcos’s property, asked Merrill to deposit the 
Arelma assets into an escrow account.150  Merrill refused.151  Instead, to settle 
competing claims to the Arelma assets, Merrill filed a federal interpleader 
 
 140 Id.  In re Estate of Marcos details the alleged abuses in horrifying detail.  Id. at 1463. 
 141 Philippines v. Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. 2180, 2185 (2008). 
 142 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. ENC Corp., 464 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“Arelma is a shell corporation . . . .”); US Supreme Court Allows RP Courts to Hear Arelma Case, GMA 
NEWS ONLINE (June 14, 2008, 02:14 AM), http://www.gmanews.tv/story/101085/US-Supreme-Court-allows-
RP-courts-to-hear-Arelma-case. 
 143 Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. at 2185. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).  The district court certified the class as “all 
civilian citizens of the Philippines who, between 1972 and 1986, were tortured, summarily executed, or 
‘disappeared’ by Philippine military or paramilitary groups” and deceased class members.  Id. at 771.  The 
class of claimants will be referred to throughout as the “Pimentel class.” 
 146 Marcos died during the pendency of the various actions.  Id. 
 147 Id. at 772. 
 148 Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. at 2186. 
 149 Id. at 2185. 
 150 Id. at 2186. 
 151 Id. 
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action152 naming as defendants, inter alia, the Republic of the Philippines (the 
Republic), the Commission, Arelma, and the Pimentel class.153  Both the 
Commission and the Republic invoked sovereign immunity pursuant to the 
FSIA, and each moved to dismiss the case pursuant to Rule 19(b).154 
The district court denied the 19(b) motions, and the parties appealed to the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which entered a stay pending the 
outcome of concurrent litigation in the Philippines over the Marcos assets.155  
The district court judge subsequently vacated the court of appeals’ stay, 
awarded the Arelma assets to the Pimentel class, and rejected the requests by 
the Republic and the Commission to dismiss the case.156  Four parties 
appealed: the Republic, the Commission, Arelma, and the Philippine National 
Bank (PNB).157 
The court of appeals, dealing with the case again after the district court 
awarded the assets to the Pimentel class and denied the Rule 19 motions, held 
that dismissal was not warranted because, although the Republic and the 
Commission were necessary parties,158 the Republic’s claim had “no practical 
likelihood” of success and thus “[n]o injustice [was] done it if it now los[t] 
what it [could] never effectually possess.”159  The Republic, the Commission, 
Arelma, and the PNB each appealed, specifically challenging the denial of the 
19(b) motion to dismiss, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.160 
2. The Supreme Court’s Rule 19 Analysis 
Conceding that “the application of subdivision (a) of Rule 19 is not 
contested,”161 the Court spent the majority of its opinion on 19(b) analyzing 
 
 152 See 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
of interpleader . . . if (1) [t]wo or more adverse claimants . . . are claiming or may claim to be entitled to such 
money or property . . . .”). 
 153 Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. at 2186. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 2186–87. 
 156 Id. at 2187. 
 157 Id. 
 158 To use the language in effect at the time of the decision, the Republic and the Commission were 
“necessary” parties pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 19. 
 159 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. ENC Corp., 464 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 160 Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. at 2187 (citing Philippines v. Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. 705 (2007)). 
 161 Id. at 2189 (“The Republic and the Commission are required entities . . . .  All parties appear to 
concede this.”); cf. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 108 (“We may 
assume, at the outset, that Dutcher falls within the category of persons who, under § (a), should be ‘joined if 
feasible.’”). 
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whether the interpleader action could continue without the Republic and the 
Commission as “required entities” under 19(a).162  The majority chided the 
appellate court for addressing the merits of the Republic and the Commission’s 
arguments after their invocation of sovereign immunity, calling that inquiry 
“itself an infringement on foreign sovereign immunity.”163 
The brunt of the Court’s opinion focused on the first factor of Rule 19(b)—
the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might 
prejudice that person or the existing parties.164  The Supreme Court found a 
prevailing interest in engendering comity among nations by allowing a foreign 
state to resolve disputes in its own courts, and a concurrent dignity interest in 
not subverting that system without “right or good cause.”165  Accordingly, the 
Court found that purporting to dispose of the Arelma assets in lieu of allowing 
the sovereign state to proceed in its own courts would unduly prejudice the 
sovereigns, directly implicating the first factor of 19(b).166  It would, in short, 
“fail[] to give full effect to sovereign immunity.”167 
The Court’s analysis under the first factor evidences a policy strongly in 
favor of deferring to the protections of sovereign immunity.168  The Court 
implicitly found that resolving outstanding claims to the disputed Arelma 
assets was not a sufficiently “right or good [enough] cause” to justify 
continuation of the case.169  This is not to suggest there was no cause for 
finalizing claim to the Merrill account and disposing of the disputed assets;170 
 
 162 See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i) (deciding the case may “as a practical matter impair or impede the 
[required party’s] ability to protect [its] interest”); In re Philippines, 309 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“Without the Republic and the [Commission] as parties in this interpleader action, their interests in the subject 
matter are not protected.”). 
 163 Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. at 2189.  Despite the fact that the appellate court issued no binding judgment as to 
the case’s merits, the jurisdiction-stripping created by the FSIA rendered any consideration or court action 
other than immediate dismissal outside of the judges’ purview.  Id.  The majority conceded that some 
evaluation of the merits may be unavoidable when evaluating Rule 19 motions, but not when the claim in 
question is substantive, nonfrivolous, and asserted by an absent, required entity properly invoking sovereign 
immunity.  Id. at 2191–92. 
 164 Id. at 2189 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b)(1)). 
 165 Id. at 2190. 
 166 Id. at 2190–92. 
 167 Id. at 2190. 
 168 Id. at 2189–90 (“[Sovereign immunity] is premised upon the ‘perfect equality and absolute 
independence of sovereigns . . . .’” (quoting Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 
(1812))). 
 169 Id. at 2190. 
 170 At the very least, the use of an interpleader action suggests that the cause was to allow Merrill to 
definitely settle claims to money it held.  See Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. Jones, 106 F.2d 341, 344 (7th Cir. 
1939) (“The interpleader statute was enacted for the protection of one who makes no claim to money in his 
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rather, the Court’s finding shows the subservience of those concerns to the 
perceived rights inherent in sovereignty. 
Despite the lack of precedent directly on point for joinder of foreign 
sovereigns, the Court cited two cases in which federal government immunity 
and Rule 19 came into conflict, and declared their overall holdings to be clear: 
“A case may not proceed when a required-entity sovereign is not amenable to 
suit.”171  While this conclusion seems to flow logically from the nature of Rule 
19 and sovereign immunity applied in a vacuum, it ignores the possibility of 
permuting either dogmatic outcome to fashion a responsive solution, a point 
emphasized by Justice Stevens in his dissent.172 
As to the second 19(b) factor—whether the court could lessen or avoid the 
prejudice through any means other than dismissal—the Court discerned “no 
substantial argument to allow the action to proceed.”173  In a single paragraph, 
the Pimentel Court explained that any complete and final judgment as to the 
Marcos assets would require the participation of the Commission and the 
Republic because settling ownership of the assets would necessitate deciding 
whether the Republic had a prima facie claim to the money at all.174 
The Court found that the third factor, the adequacy of the judgment without 
the absent party, likewise favored the sovereigns: “Going forward with the 
action . . . would not further the public interest in settling the dispute as a 
whole because the Republic and the Commission would not be bound . . . .”175  
Finally, the Court looked to Rule 19(b)’s fourth consideration: whether the 
plaintiff would have an adequate remedy following dismissal.176  This factor is 
of traditional importance, specifically highlighted in the Advisory Committee’s 
notes and mentioned approvingly in Provident Tradesmens: “[T]he court 
 
possession and who wishes to be relieved of liability, where diverse parties are making adverse claims to the 
fund.”). 
 171 Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. at 2191.  The Court cited Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371 
(1945), and Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939), calling the analyses of the cases “somewhat 
perfunctory” but elucidating the holdings.  Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. at 2090–91. 
 172 See infra Parts III.A.3, IV. 
 173 Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. at 2192.  Justice Kennedy specifically said, “No alternative remedies or forms of 
relief have been proposed to us or appear to be available.”  Id. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. at 2193. 
 176 Id.  The Court stressed that the court of appeals erroneously analyzed this factor as if the Pimentel 
class—who allegedly suffered a decade of brutal human rights violations—was the plaintiff, when Merrill filed 
the interpleader action.  Id.  The Court stated, “We do not ignore that, in context, the Pimentel class . . . are to 
some extent comparable to the plaintiffs in noninterpleader cases.  Their interests are not irrelevant . . . .”  Id.  
Regardless, the Court focused its analysis on the interests of Merrill Lynch. 
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should consider whether there is any assurance that the plaintiff, if dismissed, 
could sue effectively in another forum where better joinder would be 
possible.”177 
Merrill pressed that dismissal would deny it the benefit of a judgment 
allowing it to finally (and in a single proceeding) dispense of the assets in 
question178: 
Merrill would be left without guidance from the courts as to the 
proper disposition of those assets (or who properly controls the 
Arelma account), and could potentially be forced—after years of 
litigation over a res in which Merrill has never claimed any interest—
to defend lawsuits by the various claimants in different jurisdictions, 
possibly leading to inconsistent judgments.179 
The Pimentel majority admitted that dismissal would not provide Merrill 
with a judgment to settle ownership of the assets, but it would, the Court 
argued, protect against piecemeal litigation.180  The Court’s logic, somewhat 
perplexingly, worked as follows: “In any later suit against it Merrill Lynch 
may seek to join the Republic and the Commission and have the action 
dismissed under Rule 19(b) should they again assert sovereign immunity.”181  
Even Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, admitted that this is a tenuous 
and inarticulate solution at best, stating that it would only “to some extent” 
serve the interests in question.182 
Despite functionally conceding that Merrill would be without effective 
recourse absent continuation of the interpleader action,183 the Court concluded 
 
 177 Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 109 n.3 (1968) (alteration in 
original) (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 19 advisory committee’s note) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 178 Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. at 2193. 
 179 Brief of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 
14, Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. 2180 (No. 06-1204).  Merrill’s argument is a textbook justification for the existence 
and use of interpleader.  See FREER, supra note 27, at 698 (“The question of ownership is litigated once, with 
all claimants and the present possessor of the property being bound by the judgment.”); id. at 699 & n.2 
(discussing that the purpose of interpleader is to “avoid subjecting a party to double, multiple, or inconsistent 
obligations”). 
 180 Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. at 2193. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Asking Merrill Lynch to repeatedly invoke 19(b) motions to force dismissal of any future lawsuit is 
not a solution whatsoever: rather than help Merrill avoid spending time and money to repeatedly fight 
claimants in court, it only potentially shortens those battles, and only assuming the trial court correctly applies 
the Pimentel precedent.  Justice Kennedy concluded in no uncertain terms that the decision “leaves the 
Pimentel class, which has waited for years now to be compensated for grievous wrongs, with no immediate 
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that the prejudice to the Republic and the Commission of letting the case 
continue outweighed any ill effects suffered by Merrill as the stakeholder.184  
“Dismissal,” the Court stated, “under Rule 19(b) will mean, in some instances, 
that plaintiffs will be left without a forum for definitive resolution of their 
claims.  But that result is contemplated under the doctrine of foreign sovereign 
immunity.”185  This conclusion gets to the troublesome heart of Pimentel: the 
logic and function of the Federal Rules are each subservient to the concerns of 
sovereign immunity when the latter is an issue, seemingly regardless of the 
consequences such adherence precipitates for either doctrine. 
3. Justice Stevens’s Dissent as a Case for Pragmatics 
Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the 
Court gave too much weight to the invocation of sovereign immunity and that, 
if the Court took other less drastic measures, the Republic and the Commission 
would be amenable to waiving sovereign immunity for further proceedings.186  
Justice Stevens illuminated a number of arguments made by the Republic and 
the Commission that illustrated how a court could fashion pragmatic solutions.  
For example, both the Republic and the Commission argued that the district 
court judge lacked impartiality because of certain ex parte communications he 
engaged in with attorneys for Merrill Lynch and because of his unwillingness 
to make case documents available to all parties.  As such, Justice Stevens 
deduced that either sovereign would be willing to participate in reformed 
proceedings in front of a new judge because each had waived immunity in 
similar past proceedings.187  Justice Stevens’s analysis of the underlying 
proceedings typifies the sort of pragmatism and flexibility that current Rule 19 
jurisprudence demands and will be explored in greater detail in Part IV of this 
Comment. 
 
way to recover . . . .  And it leaves Merrill Lynch . . . without a judgment.”  Id. at 2194.  Such an outcome can 
hardly be called a solution. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Justice Stevens suggested remanding the case to either stay proceedings “pending a reasonably prompt 
decision of the Sandiganbayan,” a Philippine court of special jurisdiction that was separately attempting to 
determine ownership of the disputed assets at the time of the Pimentel case, or to reassign the case to a 
different district court judge.  Id. at 2195 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Souter 
also concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the case should be remanded for a stay of the 
proceedings to await a decision by the Philippine court.  Id. at 2197–98 (Souter, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 187 Id. at 2196–97 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Justice Stevens also disagreed with the majority’s balancing of the Rule 19 
factors.188  In particular, he argued that the nature of the claim (settling 
financial accounts, rather than deciding liability), coupled with the actions of 
the sovereign parties in other instances, suggested affording their sovereign 
interests less weight than in the ordinary case.189  Taking steps to shift the 
balancing, he said, would allow the Court to adequately protect the sovereigns 
without denying Merrill Lynch due recourse.  Justice Stevens concluded that 
the majority’s approach was ultimately “more inflexible”—less pragmatic—
than Rule 19 contemplates since all of the parties had a formidable interest in 
promptly and effectively settling the dispute.190 
B. The Similar Difficulties Presented by Rule 19 and Tribal Sovereign 
Immunity 
The challenge of sovereign immunity vis-à-vis compulsory joinder is not 
an altogether new quandary.191  Still, the reappearance of this seeming impasse 
in a 2008 Supreme Court decision suggests that the facial incompatibility of 
the two ideas continues to perplex courts.  The problem is evident beyond the 
confines of Pimentel.  Specifically, Rule 19(b) dismissals are a recurring 
problem in cases involving domestic sovereigns,192 with the same attendant 
dangers as are manifest in Pimentel.  This section traces a number of cases in 
lower federal courts evincing the problems undergirding the Court’s holding in 
Pimentel. 
1. Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton193 
illustrates the difficulty that tribal sovereignty presents in Rule 19 cases.  In 
Norton, the Citizen Potawatomi Nation, a federally recognized Indian tribe,194 
brought a mandamus action against the Department of the Interior to challenge 
its criteria for determining health services funding under a tribal self-
 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. at 2197. 
 190 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 191 See supra note 171. 
 192 See generally Merkley, supra note 117 (discussing tribal sovereign immunity in Rule 19 cases). 
 193 248 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 194 See supra text accompanying note 128 (discussing the availability of tribal sovereignty protections 
only to federally recognized tribes). 
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governance compact.195  The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to join 
three other tribes, each of which participated in the funding agreement at 
issue.196  The defendants alleged that each of the absent tribes was 
indispensable to the disposition of the case.197  The district court agreed, 
granted the Rule 19 motion, and dismissed the case; the plaintiff-tribe 
appealed.198 
Tribal sovereignty inarguably prevented joinder of the absent tribes, 
leaving the court of appeals with only the question of whether the absent 
parties were indispensable or merely necessary;199 the court found that the 
absent Shawnee tribe (the one with which the Citizen Potawatomi Nation 
particularly took issue) was merely a necessary party.200  The court further 
found that the United States, as defendant, could not adequately represent the 
goals and interests of the absent tribe.  The tribe sought its share of funding 
under a shared health service scheme, while the United States had an interest 
only in implementing uniform national Native American policy—two goals not 
necessarily aligned to the same outcome.201 
Having satisfied the prerequisite question of Rule 19(a) necessity, the court 
turned to Rule 19(b) indispensability to decide whether it could, in “equity and 
good conscience,” continue the action without the absent tribes.202  The court’s 
stunted analysis attempted to weigh the impact of any potential decision on the 
absent Shawnee tribe against the fact that the Citizen Potawatomi Nation 
would be without an alternative forum.203 
The Citizen Potawatomi (as plaintiff-tribe) argued that 19(b)’s fourth 
factor—the non-availability of alternate relief—strongly counseled in favor of 
allowing the case to proceed.204  The court conceded that the Department of the 
 
 195 Norton, 248 F.3d at 995–96.  A self-governance compact is a “legally binding and mutually 
enforceable written agreement that affirms the government-to-government relationship between a Self-
Governance Tribe and the United States.”  OFFICE OF TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE, TRIBAL SELF-
GOVERNANCE: A HANDBOOK FOR TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS 8 (2009), available at 
http://www.tribalselfgov.org/2008_subpages/2009_sgconf/SG_HandbookTribalGovts.pdf. 
 196 Norton, 248 F.3d at 996. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. at 997. 
 200 Id. at 1000. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 19) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 203 Id. 
 204 Cf. supra note 179 and accompanying text (recounting Merrill’s arguments as to the prejudice thrust 
upon it under 19(b)’s fourth factor). 
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Interior’s sovereign immunity prevented pursuing the claims in any other 
tribunal: “[I]f the Citizen Potawatomi cannot challenge Defendants’ 
administrative decisions, then no one can.”205  Despite explicitly recognizing 
the prejudice its decision would force on the plaintiff-tribe, the court ended its 
19(b) analysis without actively seeking a way to distribute or lessen that 
burden, and deferred to the discretion of the district court.  Relying on the 
unsupported base assertion that there was “no way” to lessen the prejudice 
suffered by the plaintiff-tribe, and noting the “strong policy favoring dismissal 
when a court cannot join a tribe because of sovereign immunity,” the court of 
appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal.206 
Norton presents the same troubling quagmire as Pimentel: the complete 
denial of relief because of sovereign immunity enjoyed by only a subset of 
parties.207  In both cases, the courts were unable to assuage sufficiently the 
concerns of 19(b)’s fourth factor, conceding outright that the decisions 
foreclosed the possibility of relief for the plaintiff, but characterizing such 
concerns as the natural byproducts of sovereign immunity.208  In neither case 
did the courts attempt to overcome the impasse by applying anything short of 
strict, preconceived notions of the Rules and sovereign immunity.  The lack of 
full 19(b) analysis from the court in Norton further indicates that, when 
confronted by the seemingly absolute protections of sovereign immunity, 
courts forego the chance to reconcile conflicting doctrines in search of a 
pragmatic solution, and fall instead to overwrought notions of protecting states 
at the expense of all else—including the parties to the dispute and the 
functioning of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma v. 
Kempthorne 
Unfortunately, despite the Supreme Court’s attempt to mediate the 
inconsistencies between joinder and sovereign immunity, the difficulties 
 
 205 Norton, 248 F.3d at 1000 (emphasis added). 
 206 Id. at 1001 (quoting Davis v. United States, 192 F.3d 951, 960 (10th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 207 Id. (dismissing the case “even though the district court’s decision meant there is no way to challenge 
the conduct in question”).  In Pimentel, sovereign immunity existed only for two of the four defendants.  See 
supra note 154 and accompanying text.  In Norton, by contrast, sovereign immunity existed, for the purposes 
of that suit, for only the defendant tribes; the United States Federal Government did not assert sovereign 
immunity.  See Norton, 248 F.3d at 997. 
 208 Cf. supra text accompanying note 185 (explaining that sovereign immunity contemplates dismissals 
despite lack of alternate forums). 
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created by the intersection of the two doctrines persist post-Pimentel.  United 
Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma v. Kempthorne,209 decided 
almost a year after Pimentel, illustrates the ongoing problem.  In Kempthorne, 
the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma, an independent 
Indian tribe, alleged that the government failed to secure the tribe’s 
authorization before entering into a health services contract with the Cherokee 
Nation of Oklahoma.210  The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to join 
the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, arguing that, as a signatory to the contract 
in dispute, it was a necessary and indispensable party.211 
The district court agreed, reiterating the notion that “a party to a contract is 
the paradigm of a party that is required under Rule 19(a).”212  The Cherokee 
Nation thus had a “vital and immediate interest because th[e] action involve[d] 
the Cherokee Nation’s contract.”213  The Cherokee Nation, however, was 
protected from suit by sovereign immunity, rendering its joinder infeasible 
without a clear waiver or abrogation by Congress, neither of which existed.214 
The court determined that it could not in equity and good conscience allow 
the case to proceed absent this indispensable party, finding that all four factors 
weighed in favor of dismissal.215  Considering the first and second factors, the 
court found that continuing the action would impair the interests of the 
Cherokee Nation in a way that the court could not lessen.216  The court stated it 
had “no way to fashion a remedy that would not impact Cherokee Nation’s 
contract,” citing as support the analogous conclusion by the court of appeals in 
Norton.217 
Weighing the 19(b) criteria, the Kempthorne court found that the third 
factor also favored dismissal because (if the case proceeded to a judgment) the 
Cherokee Nation, not a party to any judgment, might subsequently file suit 
 
 209 630 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (E.D. Okla. 2009). 
 210 Id. at 1298. 
 211 Id. at 1299. 
 212 Id. at 1302.  “A party to a contract is the quintessential ‘“indispensable party” and no procedural 
principle is more deeply embedded in the common than that, in any action to set aside a lease or contract, all 
parties who may be affected by the determination of the action are indispensable.’”  Id. at 1301 (quoting 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Hodel, 821 F.2d 537, 540 (10th Cir. 1987)). 
 213 Id. at 1302. 
 214 Id.  The Kempthorne court cited Pimentel, but only for the law of Rule 19—not for any sovereign 
immunity comparisons.  Id. at 1301. 
 215 Id. at 1303–04. 
 216 Id. at 1304–05. 
 217 Id. at 1304. 
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against the present parties, challenging the actions required by the court’s 
order.  Such challenges, the court stated, have the distinct potential of breeding 
conflicting obligations and subjecting the United States to multiple lawsuits.218  
It is axiomatic that such an approach would not promote the societal goal of 
completely resolving disputes.  Similarly, society had no tangible interest in 
upsetting the status quo functioning of tribal health compacts in a way that 
would simply engender further litigation.219  As to the fourth factor, the 
availability of an alternate forum, the court—like the courts in both Pimentel 
and Norton—conceded that none existed and dismissed concerns about the 
impossibility of alternate avenues of relief as “contemplated under the doctrine 
of tribal sovereign immunity.”220 
Both Norton and Kempthorne are representative of a series of cases 
throughout the federal system in which the prophylactic severity of sovereign 
immunity compels Rule 19 dismissals.221  These cases mirror the logic of 
Pimentel, where the perceived immutability of sovereign immunity forced the 
Court to a disconcerting outcome despite conceding the inability of the 
plaintiff to secure relief in any alternate forum.222 
C. Pimentel as Precedent and the Continued Difficulties of Sovereignty in 
Federal Courts: SourceOne Global Partners as an Example of the Ongoing 
Uncertainty 
Subsequent invocations of Pimentel as precedent suggest that it did little to 
clarify the workings of Rule 19 and sovereign immunity as intersecting 
doctrines.  As of early 2011, courts had cited Pimentel as precedent in a limited 
number of circumstances and with circumscribed import.223  Often cases with 
 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. at 1304–05.  This conclusion mirrors both the logic and language of the majority in Pimentel.  See 
supra text accompanying note 185. 
 221 See supra note 192. 
 222 Nicholas Merkley has roundly criticized the preponderance of Rule 19 dismissals in cases of tribal 
sovereign immunity, arguing that “many courts . . . giv[e] insufficient weight to the federal government’s 
ability, and duty, to represent the interests of absent tribes” and that “litigants and courts overlook alternative 
procedural mechanisms that could resolve the majority of Rule 19 issues.”  Merkley, supra note 117, at 932. 
 223 See, e.g., GE Bus. Fin. Servs. Inc. v. Sundance Res., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-00253-B, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 43753, at *4–6 (N.D. Tex. May 21, 2009) (citing Pimentel for the basics of how to proceed with a Rule 
19 analysis); Wilson v. Can. Life Assurance Co., No. 4:08-CV-1258, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16714, at *6–8 
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2009) (same).  Litigants eager to rely on recent Rule 19 Supreme Court precedent have 
forced a number of courts to distinguish Pimentel.  See, e.g., Humboldt Baykeeper v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 
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remarkably analogous facts, such as Kempthorne, do not cite Pimentel for its 
authority vis-à-vis sovereign immunity.224  The fact that Pimentel represented a 
departure from traditional Supreme Court jurisprudence, which favored 
continuing a case unless alternate relief existed, raises the specter that courts 
will struggle to understand and apply it in cases of joinder and sovereign 
immunity.  And although Kempthorne opted not to cite Pimentel as authority 
on the question of immunity’s role in compulsory joinder cases, at least one 
other case has done so. 
In May 2009, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois decided 
SourceOne Global Partners, LLC v. KGK Synergize, Inc.225  SourceOne, which 
had been manufacturing dietary supplements, sought a declaratory judgment to 
establish that it did not infringe KGK’s patent.226  Prior to the commencement 
of litigation, two of the patent’s original four owners assigned their rights in 
the patent to the United States government.227  Because KGK did not own the 
patent exclusively, it filed a motion to dismiss for failure to join the United 
States as a necessary and indispensable party.228 
Both parties agreed that the Government satisfied the 19(a) criteria for a 
required party and that joinder was not feasible because of sovereign 
immunity.229  Weighing the harm to each party from continuation or dismissal, 
the SourceOne court used the holding of Pimentel to decree that the case at 
issue did not necessitate dismissal: 
In Pimental [sic], the Supreme Court stated that under Rule 19, 
“dismissal of the action must be ordered where there is a potential for 
injury to the interests of the absent sovereign.”  Conversely, the 
absence of prejudice to the Government in this case . . . weighs 
strongly in favor of allowing the case to proceed.230 
The court found no evidence that KGK, as defendant, could not fully protect 
the interests of the Government.231  To the contrary, the court found that since 
 
C 06-02560 JSW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48131, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2009) (stressing that, unlike the case 
before the court, the Pimentel decision dealt with a situation of uncontested 19(a) applicability). 
 224 See supra note 214. 
 225 No. 08 C 7403, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40330 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2009). 
 226 Id. at *2. 
 227 Id. at *4. 
 228 Id. at *2. 
 229 Id. at *15. 
 230 Id. at *22 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  The court’s inference is not directly supported by the 
language of the Pimentel majority. 
 231 Id. at *20–22. 
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both KGK and the Government owned some of the same patent, they sought 
the same outcome, making the former an effective conduit for the interests of 
the latter, significantly easing the burdens of Rule 19 analysis.232 
The court made quick work of 19(b)’s second factor, stating that although 
there was no way to shape relief to lessen prejudice to the Government, that 
concern was of little import because KGK adequately protected the 
Government’s interests and because specific caselaw holds that the second 
factor is of little relevance in patent cases.233  The third factor’s concern with 
inconsistent judgments and duplicative litigation amounted to a “nonstarter” 
because the Government, protected from the present suit by sovereign 
immunity, would likewise be protected from any future suit.234 
The court turned lastly to 19(b)’s fourth factor to decide whether 
SourceOne would have an adequate remedy if the case were dismissed for 
nonjoinder.  KGK’s only suggested alternate forum (the Court of Federal 
Claims) was barred by statute.235  Such nonexistence of relief “weigh[ed] 
heavily in favor of allowing [the suit] to proceed.”236  Conversely, the 
defendants argued that the lack of alternate relief for SourceOne was simply 
“‘the inevitable effect’ of the United States’ ability to assert sovereign 
immunity.”237  Their argument was, in effect, the reductionist logic brandished 
by the Court in Pimentel and reiterated in Kempthorne: that lack of relief was 
“contemplated under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.”238  The SourceOne 
court, however, found this argument unavailing, decrying the suggestion that 
SourceOne simply wait until the government and KGK together decide to sue 
it for infringement: “[The court] do[es] not share KGK’s and the Government’s 
comfort with that approach.”239  Faced with Pimentel’s conclusion that 
sovereign immunity contemplates unbalanced outcomes, the SourceOne court 
thus distinguished Pimentel.240 
 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. at *22–23. 
 234 Id. at *23. 
 235 Id. at *24 (“[The statute] permits private parties to bring patent infringement suits against the United 
States in the Court of Federal Claims for certain money damages only, and thus it would not provide an 
adequate forum for SourceOne’s declaratory judgment claims.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006))). 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. at *24–25. 
 238 See supra text accompanying notes 185, 220. 
 239 SourceOne, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40330, at *25. 
 240 Id. at *26–27 (“We disagree with KGK and the Government that Pimentel requires a different 
result . . . .  [T]here are important factors that distinguish this case . . . .”). 
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The difficulty the SourceOne court faced in balancing the competing 
interests was the risk of giving too much credence to KGK’s arguments and 
not viewing the injustice to SourceOne through the “prism of ‘equity and good 
conscience.’”241  KGK’s suggested outcome would allow it to threaten legal 
action against SourceOne and others with impunity and, should any of the 
threatened parties resort to legal action, “KGK could retreat behind the 
Government’s cloak of immunity” and prevent the issue “from ever being 
tested in court.”242  Giving KGK such “unreviewable sway in exercising its 
patent rights” would do little to advance public faith in the effective operation 
of the judiciary.243 
The SourceOne court then tackled the Pimentel precedent directly.  In 
Pimentel, no single party could adequately protect the rights of the sovereigns, 
unlike KGK’s ability to do so in the case at bar.244  According to the 
SourceOne court, dismissal in Pimentel was sanctioned because the Court 
found it would “not cause prejudice to Merrill Lynch.”245  Lastly, unlike in 
Pimentel, where the Philippines offered a potential alternate justice system, the 
SourceOne case did not implicate any other legal systems because the 
sovereigns were all domestic and tied to American courts.246  Thus, this case 
did not imperil significant comity or dignity interests by usurping the proper 
functioning of a foreign nation’s court system.  The totality of these 
differences, the district court reasoned, allowed the case to continue absent the 
required sovereign.247 
There are two ways to think about the patterns of SourceOne.  On the one 
hand, the court effectively distinguished Pimentel and allowed the case to 
proceed despite the challenges of sovereign immunity.  At the same time, the 
decision is a worrisome harbinger of the post-Pimentel uncertainty engendered 
by the Supreme Court’s first perplexing foray into Rule 19 law in decades.  
This uncertainty is evidenced by the court’s intense fact-specific wrangling to 
 
 241 Id. at *25. 
 242 Id. at *25–26. 
 243 Id. at *26. 
 244 Id. at *27. 
 245 Id. at *28.  This Comment disagrees with that analysis.  See supra notes 176–85 and accompanying 
text. 
 246 SourceOne, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40330, at *28. 
 247 Id. at *29. 
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fit Pimentel around a just outcome.248  The decision also typifies the 
divergence among courts as to how to handle the challenges posed by 
sovereigns.  SourceOne presented facts very similar to Pimentel, Norton, and 
Kempthorne, and cited to Pimentel as authority on questions of compulsory 
joinder of sovereigns despite reaching a contrary conclusion. 
The importance of Pimentel as defining precedent is unclear in the face of 
SourceOne.  The fact that the SourceOne court reached a conclusion analogous 
to the (later reversed) district and appellate courts in the Pimentel litigation 
signals a divergence between lower courts, which are tasked with fact-
intensive Rule 19 inquiries, and the Supreme Court, which ultimately reviews 
the propriety of such determinations.249  Such a disconnect represents but one 
of the reasons why Rule 19 is a veritable landmine for courts in charge of its 
application and why sovereign immunity only injects further uncertainty into 
such analyses.  While this Comment agrees with the outcome of SourceOne, 
the fact that the district court had to wrestle with Pimentel at all suggests the 
dangers of the chasm between the Supreme Court’s edicts and the pragmatic 
demands upon trial courts. 
D. The Untenable Evisceration of Rule 19 and the Unintended Enlargement of 
Sovereign Immunity 
As noted previously, the doctrine of sovereign immunity exists to protect 
sovereign entities from suit in foreign court systems.250  The shield of 
sovereign immunity is theoretically limited to the sovereign qua actor, or to its 
designated subdivision.251  Individuals living in foreign nations, for example, 
 
 248 See supra Part I.E (explaining the historical development of certain Rule 19 decisions and noting that 
pre-Pimentel Supreme Court precedent coalesced around a broad reading of Rule 19 that often resulted in the 
Court allowing cases to continue, rather than ordering dismissal). 
 249 The Supreme Court has never declared the standard of review for a Rule 19 decision, declining the 
opportunity to do so in Pimentel: “We have not addressed the standard of review for Rule 19(b) 
decisions. . . .  Whatever the appropriate standard of review, a point we need not decide, the judgment could 
not stand.”  Philippines v. Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. 2180, 2189 (2008).  The Court did say that “[t]he case-specific 
inquiry [of Rule 19] . . . implies some degree of deference to the district court.”  Id.  Other circuits have 
addressed the standard of review, and the majority give substantial deference to trial courts and their role as 
fact finders.  See Tell v. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 145 F.3d 417, 418 (1st Cir. 1998) (discussing the differences 
among circuits as to the standard of review for Rule 19 decisions). 
 250 See supra Part II.A. 
 251 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, for example, grants sovereignty to “foreign state[s].”  28 
U.S.C. § 1604 (2006).  Section 1603(a) defines “foreign state” as including “a political subdivision of a foreign 
state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b).”  Subsection (b) then limits 
the definition to agencies and instrumentalities that are separate legal persons, “which [are] organ[s] of a 
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do not generally benefit personally from their government’s judicial immunity 
unless specifically designated by statute.252  The sovereignty of state A is not 
supposed to protect party B, a nonsovereign, from suit.  Likewise A’s 
sovereignty should not protect its citizen C or domestic corporation D from 
suit unless C or D is an organ or subdivision of the state.  While the conscious 
choice to provide immunity to nations is suggested to anticipate (and implicitly 
sanction) one-sided outcomes in the area of compulsory joinder,253 little 
evidence suggests that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should, through 
unscrupulous judicial action, augment sovereign immunity by protecting 
undeserving, nonsovereign third parties.  Such a result, however, is the 
apparent and inevitable pattern among Rule 19 and sovereign immunity cases 
in the status quo. 
Pimentel justifiably presents the notion that the Republic and the 
Commission, proper sovereigns, should be protected from a suit to which they 
do not waive immunity or to which an exception does not apply.  However, the 
resulting dismissal of the entire proceeding also protected Marcos’s shadow 
corporation (Arelma) and the Philippine National Bank from suit.  The 
dismissal also prevented the Pimentel class from having even the chance to 
secure some of the billions to which it was entitled.254  While the nature of the 
interpleader action likely rendered the protection from suit of little value to the 
PNB or the Pimentel class, it nonetheless shows the troublesome evolution of 
sovereign immunity under the Rules toward a doctrine protecting nonsovereign 
parties in addition to proper sovereigns. 
Norton perhaps shows the problem more clearly.  The Department of the 
Interior lacked its ordinary sovereign immunity by virtue of the Citizen 
Potawatomi Nation’s use of a mandamus action to compel an officer of the 
United States to perform a statutory duty owed to the tribe.255  The Tenth 
Circuit’s 19(b) dismissal, however, effectively used the sovereignty of other 
 
foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is 
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof.”  Id. § 1603(a)–(b). 
 252 See id.  The FSIA would allow an individual to benefit from her nation’s foreign sovereign immunity, 
but only if particularized conditions are satisfied such that the person operates at the behest of—or is closely 
intertwined with—the foreign nation.  Id. 
 253 See Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. at 2194 (discussing the logic of sovereignty and its intended results, if 
immunity is properly invoked). 
 254 See supra text accompanying note 147. 
 255 Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton, 248 F.3d 993, 995 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The complaint also 
presented an action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States to 
perform a duty owed to the Plaintiff.” (emphasis added) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2006))). 
ANDRE GALLEYSFINAL 6/7/2011  8:29 AM 
1196 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60 
tribal nations absent from the litigation to insulate the government from the 
suit—reinstating the sovereign immunity it had lost by statute.  Thus, despite 
presumably valid claims against a government body with a statutory duty and 
corresponding congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity, the 
sovereignty of another party worked to benefit the properly present defendant.  
At the hands of the Norton court, Rule 19 became a tool to enlarge the ambit of 
sovereignty protections beyond the sovereign defendant onto third parties.  
Such an outcome can hardly be “contemplated” under sovereign immunity256 
or justifiable in light of the immense costs it imposes on the workings of Rule 
19 and the administration of justice, precipitating situations where aggrieved 
plaintiffs are left without an alternate forum and defendants without 
sovereignty enjoy unconditional immunity from suit. 
IV.  TACKLING THE RULE 19/SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IMPASSE: A RETURN TO 
THE RULE’S VENERATED PRAGMATISM 
Rule 19 in the context of sovereign immunity presents a multifaceted 
challenge to reliable rulemaking.  This problem likewise presents no obvious 
single solution.  Few would suggest unduly constricting sovereign immunity, 
which protects admittedly admirable goals in most instances;257 likewise, I am 
not suggesting a substantive revision of Rule 19 to create a complex system of 
special rules and exceptions for cases beset by sovereignty problems.258  The 
answer, instead, is obvious from the historical criticisms of early Rule 19259 
and from the more recent critiques of the Rule 19 and sovereign immunity 
quagmire as espoused by Justice Stevens in Pimentel.260 
The solution, stated in terms most general, is for courts to return to a 
pragmatic and fine-grained analysis in each case where Rule 19 confronts 
sovereign immunity, using a variety of tools to reconcile the doctrines in any 
way possible.  Pragmatism should undoubtedly be the overriding concern in 
any compulsory joinder dispute, regardless of whether it concerns sovereign 
 
 256 See supra notes 185, 220, and accompanying text. 
 257 See supra Part II.A (discussing the goals of exempting nations from American judicial review). 
 258 Insofar as Rule 19 presents a nonexclusive list of factors, it is intentionally designed with the 
flexibility to tackle challenges such as the one discussed herein.  See generally supra Part I (discussing the 
Rule 19 factors over time).  It is thus unadvisable to attempt to muddy the waters of the Rule with major 
substantive revisions that risk upsetting decades of precedent.  But cf. Freer, supra note 36 (suggesting 
revisions to Rule 19 for other reasons). 
 259 See supra Part I.C (discussing the original Rule’s textual failings and the resultant unjust errors by 
courts). 
 260 See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing Justice Stevens’s dissent in Pimentel). 
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immunity,261 but the evident trend toward dismissal in light of sovereignty 
commands special attention.  The goal of any solution, whether promulgated 
through a statutory regime or keyed to a more responsive case-by-case 
approach, must be to honor Rule 19’s raison d’être: effectively settling 
disputes. 
On the ground, privileging pragmatism would entail a combination of 
responses by a variety of actors.  Congress has the power to abrogate immunity 
to stem the tide of troublesome decisions in the status quo.  Courts, as the 
forums for Rule 19 analysis, bear the primary responsibility, however, for 
permuting the Rule and sovereignty in equitable ways.  Just as a judge must 
approach each case with an eye strictly attuned to pragmatics, parties on each 
side of a lawsuit who seek to continue a case despite a required party’s absence 
must be willing to work with the court to facilitate reasonable outcomes. 
A. The Dangers of Ignoring the Problem 
The overarching problem evident in the cases discussed above is the 
repeated failure of courts to remember Rule 19’s lauded pragmatism—a goal 
explicitly espoused by the Advisory Committee when formulating the modern 
view of compulsory joinder.262  While the overall trend in Rule 19 
jurisprudence since its revision in the 1960s has been toward flexible solutions 
to each unique dispute, its treatment in the context of sovereign immunity is an 
outlier.  Instead of efficiency, rigid doctrinal adherence to facially 
incompatible rules results in scattered and unpredictable outcomes. 
This inconsistency in application injects needless uncertainty into both 
Rule 19 and sovereign immunity.  At the same time, it tracks the criticism 
lobbied at the initial 1938 version of Rule 19, with its much-vaunted—but 
ultimately hollow—labels, which precipitated a minefield of conflicting 
precedents.263  Understanding the present day’s problems as an extension of 
the failings that plagued the Rule a half-century ago suggests that our solution 
too lies in history. 
Distilled to its essence, the problem that each of the proposed solutions 
must tackle is the failure of courts to work a resolution when no alternate 
 
 261 See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text (explaining the role of pragmatism in Rule 19 
decisions). 
 262 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 263 See supra Part I.C (discussing the 1966 revisions to Rule 19). 
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forum for relief exists.  It is one thing to dismiss a case knowing that a foreign 
nation’s judiciary stands ready (or even able) to resolve the dispute; it is quite 
another to admit the impossibility of relief in any forum and to dismiss the 
entire action regardless, without any serious attempt to create a compromise.264  
Professor John W. Reed, who wrote one of the most prominent criticisms of 
early Rule 19 in 1957, discussed several factors contributing to Rule 19’s 
failure to produce equitable, consistent, or predictable results, notably: an 
overreliance on labels instead of facts and a “thoughtless reiteration—instead 
of a critical reexamination—of the basic principles of required joinder.”265  
Regardless of where one assigns blame, the problem remains: parties forced 
from the nation’s courts stand discontented and without an opportunity for 
relief—a casualty of thoughtless reiterations of the sanctity of sovereign 
immunity, which itself is a preconception in need of critical reexamination. 
Judges applying Rule 19 in the context of sovereign immunity need to look 
beyond the current precedent, which tends to bind their hands, and search for a 
solution that will give plaintiffs some manner of relief.  It is inimical to the 
pursuit of justice to allow swaths of nonsovereign parties to skirt adjudication 
because a single sovereign entity has invoked sovereign immunity.266 
B. Statutory Responses: Congress as an Actor 
While courts are an obvious locus of change, Congress can also play a vital 
role, and congressional action presents the first area of potential resolution.  
Sovereign immunity is, after all, a statutory scheme,267 and Rule 19 is part of a 
congressionally approved textual code that the federal courts are charged with 
implementing.  Both tribal and foreign sovereign immunity are applicable only 
where Congress has not specifically abrogated the privilege.268  Rather than 
attempt to craft an impossibly large statute to handle every instance of 
sovereignty and Rule 19 incongruence, history suggests that statutory 
responses work when tailored to specific types of disputes. 
One example of a statutory approach is federal reclamation law, which 
contains a provision stating that, for certain claims arising under the 
Reclamation Act, the United States Federal Government, if sought to be joined 
 
 264 See supra Part III.A (discussing Pimentel, in which the Court admitted that no alternate forum existed 
but nevertheless dismissed the case). 
 265 Reed, supra note 4, at 329. 
 266 See supra Part III.D (discussing the enlargement of sovereign immunity under Rule 19). 
 267 See supra note 113. 
 268 See supra Part II.B (discussing the ability to create exceptions to sovereign immunity). 
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as a required party, waives sovereign immunity to facilitate the necessary 
joinder.269  The clause states: 
Consent is given to join the United States as a necessary party 
defendant in any suit to adjudicate . . . the contractual rights of a 
contracting entity and the United States regarding any contract 
executed pursuant to Federal reclamation law.  The United States, 
when a party to any suit, shall be deemed to have waived any right to 
plead that it is not amenable thereto by reason of its 
sovereignty . . . .270 
The reclamation waiver clause is indicative of Congress’s ability to 
effectuate limited abrogation of sovereign immunity in the name of a discrete 
goal—whether that of justice, economic development, etc.  The waiver in the 
Reclamation Act is mated to instances of joinder but does not authorize 
original suits directly against the United States.271  It is an example of how 
sovereign immunity can be waived, through careful statutory language, without 
imperiling the workings of the entire doctrine—narrow language begetting 
narrow results.  While it is impossible to state with succinct completeness a set 
of situations befitting statutory responses, the reclamation waiver is a helpful 
model for the type of solution this Comment envisions: recognition of areas of 
the law where sovereign immunity counteracts the function of the Rules, and a 
conservative but effective response. 
In Norton, for example, the Citizen Potawatomi Nation sued the Federal 
Government under a domestic statute controlling certain relations between the 
Government and Indian tribes.272  The outcome of Norton suggests that 
Congress should be prepared to build into Indian governance statutes a clause 
mirroring that in reclamation law, but tailored to the difficulty presented by 
absent indispensable tribal sovereigns.  Such a clause could state that engaging 
with the federal government under a self-governance statute waives sovereign 
immunity for the tribes involved.  Such a statute, modest in its aims, would 
neither disrespect domestic tribal justice systems nor suggest that Congress 
should unceasingly desecrate sovereignty without cause, yet it would 
significantly obviate the difficulties of Norton. 
 
 269 43 U.S.C. § 390uu (2006). 
 270 Id. 
 271 Orff v. United States, 545 U.S. 596, 602 (2005). 
 272 See supra Part III.B.1. 
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A statutory response could similarly help alleviate the impasse evident in 
Kempthorne, where a tribal party to a health services agreement refused to join 
a lawsuit, and its sovereignty resulted in dismissal of the entire proceeding.273  
Again, to the degree that such agreements between the federal government and 
tribes are authorized by statute, Congress should craft provisions into the 
statute to curtail the sovereign immunity of participating tribes—as to issues 
regarding the agreements only—in instances when their joinder will be 
necessary to the resolution of a case. 
It is less immediately clear what sort of statute could have solved Pimentel, 
but as noted above, none of the proposed solutions in this Comment should be 
taken as a complete answer to the exclusion of others.  The intricacies of the 
interpleader statute may provide room for Congress to delineate exceptions to 
the cloak of immunity where foreign nations seek title to resources held in 
American accounts, as happened in Pimentel.  Congress could create an 
exception stating that, for the purpose of interpleader actions concerning 
domestic resources, sovereigns must either waive their immunity or forfeit 
their opportunity to claim the property at all.  This proposal is especially 
appropriate given that settling title to property infrequently questions the 
political decisions of states, but rather implicates their broader functioning in 
the private realm.274 
C. Judicial Responses: Courts and Their Participants as Actors 
While Congress presents one avenue by which sovereign immunity can be 
curtailed for purposes of joinder, courts are the obvious forums for handling 
the majority of conflicts between joinder and immunity.  Solutions sited in the 
courts can take a number of forms—including rethinking the nature of 
disputes, crafting areas of the law where sovereignty is de facto abrogated by 
the actions of a nation, or shifting the focus of Rule 19’s various interests.  At 
the same time, the parties using the court system ought to be prepared to work 
compromises in lieu of leaving empty handed. 
1. Rethinking the Nature of Indispensability 
The structure of Rule 19 itself presents a possible solution: the court can 
rethink and (often) reject the conclusion that an absent sovereign is either 
 
 273 See supra Part III.B.2. 
 274 See supra Part II.B (discussing the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, which protects only 
political sovereign actions). 
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“necessary” or “indispensable” (“required”).275  If a court decides that a 
sovereign is neither necessary nor required, the court can continue to hear the 
case in its absence.  With the looming specter of dismissal, only a substantial 
threatened interest of an absent party should justify upsetting continuation of 
the case.  This solution becomes more discerning and accommodating when 
courts balance the competing interests of sovereigns and plaintiffs.  If courts 
want to truly consider the plaintiffs’ interests, it cannot be enough to say that a 
sovereign party merely has a threatened interest.  The relevant inquiry must be 
the nature and importance of the interest at stake. 
An exemplar of such progressive thinking can be found in Cachil Dehe 
Band of Wintun Indians v. California, where the Ninth Circuit held that absent 
tribes who would be only financially affected by the outcome of the litigation 
were not required parties for complete adjudication of the dispute.276  The idea 
that mere financial interest in a case’s outcome does not create a concern 
sufficient to meet the Rule 19 factors rightly privileges affording relief over 
mere monetary concerns.277  Whether such privileging is fair in every instance 
is irrelevant to the notion that it can, when properly applied, overcome 
otherwise debilitating joinder and sovereignty problems.278 
This type of fine-grained analysis would have been particularly apropos in 
Pimentel.  The Republic and the Commission’s only interest was a disputed 
financial account held in America.279  There was no overwhelming concern as 
to national functioning or governance, criminal process, sovereignty, etc.  The 
Court’s analysis—and indeed Justice Stevens contends as much280—could 
have found that the Republic and the Commission’s interest, though important, 
did not suffice to overcome Merrill’s significant interest in resolving the 
dispute and foreclosing the risk of ongoing litigation with inconsistent 
judgments.  Like any proposed Rule 19 solution, it is difficult to specify with 
any particularity a universal course of action flowing from this suggestion.  
 
 275 See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text (discussing stylistic changes to Rule 19). 
 276 547 F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The mere fact that the outcome . . . may have some financial 
consequences for the non-party tribes is not sufficient to make those tribes required parties, however.”). 
 277 See Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he court must determine 
whether the absent party has a legally protected interest in the suit.  This interest must be more than a financial 
stake . . . .”). 
 278 To be clear, the point here is not whether Cachil Dehe represents a perfect solution, nor is it to suggest 
that financial interests may not be significant.  It is instead to illustrate the viability of case-by-case 
rebalancing as a solution. 
 279 As opposed to Merrill’s interest in settling the dispute and avoiding protracted and conflicting 
litigation.  See generally Part III.A.2 (describing the various interests at stake in Pimentel). 
 280 See infra Part IV.D. 
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That failure, however, should not prevent courts from recognizing their role as 
fact finders and thus acting with greater discretion.  One aspect of such 
discretion is taking the liberty to decide when someone’s interest fails to 
provide a sufficient basis for dismissal when weighed against another’s 
decidedly more important interest. 
2. Highlighting Areas of the Law to Cabin Sovereign Immunity: Contract 
as an Example 
Another possible court-based solution is to change the relevant analysis in 
certain classes of cases where problems are recurring—similar to the proposed 
statutory responses above but within the ambit of the judiciary.  Although 
sovereign immunity is largely a statutory regime, administering a claim of 
sovereign immunity and deciding whether it has been waived is a function of 
the courts.281  As an example, the law of contract is one area where the 
protections of sovereign immunity ought not be impenetrable in the face of 
necessary joinder. 
Recognizing that the power of contract is sacrosanct, the decision to enter a 
contractual relationship is nevertheless a voluntary one,282 and one to which 
courts can attach conditions.  Decades of decisions stand for the proposition 
that parties to a contract are indispensable parties as to the resolution of 
disputes arising under that contract.283  Because contracts create voluntary 
relationships, the decision to contract with another party ought to act as a 
waiver of sovereign immunity where necessary to effectuate joinder in cases 
attempting to settle claims relating to the contract.  Put another way, a 
contractual relationship should put a party on notice that, as to the subject of 
the contract and any attendant disputes, it has waived sovereign immunity as a 
defense to joinder.284  For example, in Kempthorne, the Cherokee Nation of 
Oklahoma, by signing a health compact with the federal government,285 should 
have been held to have functionally waived sovereign immunity as to disputes 
 
 281 See supra note 97 (discussing the shifting administration of sovereign immunity from the Executive to 
the Judicial Branch). 
 282 Putting aside questions of duress and the like for the sake of simplification. 
 283 See supra notes 30, 212–13, and accompanying text. 
 284 This is not a particularly upsetting suggestion if properly conceptualized: entering into contracts is a 
largely private (as opposed to a public) function, the type of activity theoretically contemplated as outside the 
scope of modern restrictive immunity.  See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.  The suggestion here 
is simply to refine that idea: to make contracts between sovereigns and nonsovereigns instances of waived 
immunity where necessary to resolve disputes related to the contract. 
 285 See supra text accompanying note 210. 
ANDRE GALLEYSFINAL 6/7/2011  8:29 AM 
2011] COMPULSORY [MIS]JOINDER 1203 
arising under that contract.  Such an understanding of joinder and immunity 
would have allowed the Kempthorne court to force the Cherokee Nation to 
litigate claims arising over its voluntary decision to enter into a contract with 
the federal government. 
This suggestion is in line with the solution Justice Stevens offered in 
Pimentel.286  There, Justice Stevens noted, the Republic and the Commission 
each willingly participated in other proceedings (where they could have 
properly invoked immunity but did not), and he argued that a campaign to 
secure the assets using American courts was inevitable at some point, 
ultimately concluding that these circumstances justified placing less 
importance on preserving sovereign immunity.287 
This relatively simple idea would likewise ameliorate the problem posed by 
cases such as Norton.288  If, in Norton, the district court had partially 
subjugated the sovereign immunity of the absent signatory tribes because of 
their contractual relationships, it could have proceeded with the case.  At the 
same time, diluting the import of sovereign immunity in such a limited 
instance would hardly disrupt the cohesiveness of the doctrine.  It is not 
unreasonable to expect signatories to a contract to anticipate liability in future 
litigation as to that relationship.289 
To say that the shield of sovereign immunity can be used to allow 
sovereign parties to recklessly enter into contractual relationships without 
reprisal is arguably contemplated under the doctrine in the barest sense.  What 
is not contemplated, however, is that the protections of the sovereign should 
render other nonsovereign signatories to the contract without relief or beyond 
the jurisdiction of courts when disputes develop between contracting parties.  
The emergence of restrictive immunity, exempting from protection a 
government’s commercial/private acts, reflects the notion that for voluntary 
nongovernment action foreign sovereigns already enjoy only limited immunity, 
although tribes are not subject to the same limitations;290 this Comment’s 
 
 286 For a more detailed discussion of Justice Stevens’s dissent, see infra Part IV.D. 
 287 Philippines v. Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. 2180, 2197 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 288 Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton, 248 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 289 Making such a demand upon contracting parties hardly seems novel or unfair.  It is analogous to the 
personal jurisdiction doctrine, whereby purposely availing oneself of the resources and benefits of a state 
rightfully subjects one to jurisdiction of the courts of that state.  For an analysis of personal jurisdiction and the 
various tests involved therein, see FREER, supra note 27. 
 290 See supra text accompanying note 127. 
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suggestion is, by way of illustration, an offshoot of that notion.  Of course, this 
idea’s usefulness as a partial remedy is confined to cases of actual or implicit 
contractual relationships.291 
Consider again Pimentel.  Although the sovereigns had no direct 
contractual relationship with Merrill Lynch vis-à-vis the disputed Arelma 
assets, Arelma (functionally Marcos) had such a relationship when it opened 
the account and deposited money in the 1970s.292  The Republic’s attempts to 
secure those assets, then, were in effect an attempt to inherit the contractual 
relationship created by Arelma and to assume the legal obligations attendant to 
that relationship.  For the purposes of Pimentel and similar disputes, this 
Comment thus suggests treating the Republic as having had a de facto contract 
with Merrill Lynch insofar as the Republic sought to establish ownership to 
contractually secured assets.  While the Republic and the Commission did not 
seek to use American courts in that pursuit, they still sought the assets as an 
overall end.293  Accordingly, they should have been presented with two 
options: to either waive sovereign immunity for the purposes of the 
interpleader suit, or to surrender their claim for refusal to use the national 
tribunals of the country in which the contract was formed and in which the 
assets resided.  Faced with those options, and seeking the assets, it is likely that 
the sovereigns would have waived their immunity.294  This solution is 
surprisingly benign as to negating the effectiveness of sovereign immunity and 
provides, by way of example, another potential resolution to the difficulties of 
immunity and joinder. 
3. The Three Interests: Favoring Those Already Present 
Another way for courts to effectuate a more responsive approach to Rule 19 
and sovereign immunity is to remain cognizant of the classes of interests at 
stake.  There are three relevant interests: “(1) the interests of the present 
defendant; (2) the interests of potential but absent plaintiffs and defendants; 
[and] (3) the social interest in the orderly, expeditious administration of 
justice.”295 
 
 291 Implicit contractual relationships suggests that situations may arise where the relationship between 
parties is contractual in form if not in name. 
 292 See supra text accompanying note 143. 
 293 See supra text accompanying note 150. 
 294 Justice Stevens makes a convincing argument that the sovereigns were in fact willing to waive 
sovereign immunity if the court satisfied a few benign conditions.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 295 Reed, supra note 4, at 330. 
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It is beyond contestation that public interest supports the timely, efficient, 
and effective use of the courts to resolve conflicts with finality.296  The 
potentially conflicting interests of those parties already present and those not 
yet present, however, offer the opportunity for courts to change their approach 
to reach a more desirable outcome—one that preserves the availability of relief 
for those already present without substantially imperiling the interests of 
absent parties. 
Courts should strive hardest to find an alternative to dismissal where the 
interests protected by joinder are only (or overwhelmingly) those belonging to 
the first category: parties already present.  If the addition of a participant only 
protects the interests of the parties already represented, then the nonjoinder of 
the absentee will leave the defendants no worse off than they otherwise would 
have been.  This solution was effectively used in SourceOne where, although 
each side had competing and tangible interests, the court favored the interests 
of the present parties and found that the defendants had failed to prove a 
significant harm that would outweigh the plaintiff’s interests in resolving the 
dispute.297 
Consciously weighing the interests against the goal of continuation is not to 
suggest an absolute change to Rule 19’s equitable balancing, nor to state that 
the courts should universally favor one set of interests above others.  Likewise, 
it is not to trivialize the burdens potentially felt by represented defendants 
because of a nonpresent party’s absence.  Instead, this suggestion illustrates 
how courts can reshape the current doctrine to be more responsive to the needs 
of plaintiffs while still giving requisite protection to parties invoking Rule 19.  
Keeping in mind that the plaintiff initially chooses the parties to the lawsuit, 
courts should strive to protect that choice unless proper adjudication demands 
otherwise.298  Courts could protect the plaintiff’s choice through a number of 
actions, including shifting the burden of proof so that the nonpresent 
defendants must prove significant harm, changing the threshold for what is an 
 
 296 See supra text accompanying note 18 (exploring the idea that courts should afford complete justice). 
 297 See supra Part III.C (discussing the outcome in SourceOne). 
 298 Professor Reed’s admonition is illuminating: 
[C]lear thinking will be materially aided if it is remembered that the real problem in any 
compulsory joinder case is whether the initial choice of parties by the plaintiff is to be overborne 
by some combination of these three countervailing interests—not by a blind adherence to an 
elderly formula. 
Reed, supra note 4, at 330. 
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interest deserving of protection,299 or more heavily weighing the scales in favor 
of the plaintiff.  However achieved, this change would amount to a general (but 
not inviolable) favoritism for the interests of the parties already within the 
court’s ambit so that, at worst, the absent parties claiming an interest suffer no 
more than they otherwise would. 
4. Encouraging Flexibility and Compromise by Parties to the Suit 
It is worth briefly mentioning the role that parties themselves should play 
in fashioning solutions.  The regime of Pimentel and similar cases creates 
sufficient—albeit inarticulate and unsettling—precedent to order dismissal in a 
myriad of sovereignty/joinder challenges.300  Rigidity by parties only makes 
such an outcome more likely.  The parties of Pimentel exemplify the role that 
sovereigns and nonsovereigns alike can play in avoiding dismissal. 
The sovereign Pimentel defendants expressed willingness to waive 
sovereign immunity if a number of minor conditions were satisfied.  In 
particular, the sovereigns complained of perceived bias by the district court 
judge and requested that the case be reassigned.301  The willingness of the 
Republic and the Commission to waive sovereign immunity for purposes of the 
lawsuit suggests that often sovereigns that do have a real stake in the outcome 
of the lawsuit want to be present and represented if possible.  Communication 
between plaintiffs, defendants, and the courts can largely obviate the stalemate 
by shifting each side’s expectations so as to appease the overall desires of the 
parties without dismissing the lawsuit entirely. 
D. Reflecting on Potential Solutions in Practice 
Recognizing that there is no simple holistic solution to the problem evident 
in Pimentel and beyond ought only to spur courts to think of creative solutions 
to lessen the prejudice that plaintiffs confront.  In the vast majority of 
instances, a more or less comprehensive solution exists and can be executed 
without fracturing the contours of either doctrine. 
The promise of these solutions is evident in two places: Justice Stevens’s 
Pimentel dissent and the SourceOne decision.  Justice Stevens presaged this 
Comment’s criticisms in his Pimentel dissent when he argued that the 
 
 299 As discussed above in Part IV.C.1. 
 300 See supra Part III (discussing Pimentel and its value as precedent). 
 301 See supra text accompanying notes 186–87. 
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majority’s “inflexible” analysis302 ignored creative solutions within the Court’s 
purview.  He suggested various alternatives to dismissal: to stay the 
proceedings until concurrent litigation in the Philippines concluded, to reassign 
the case to a different district court judge, or to soften the import afforded to 
the invocation of sovereign immunity by the Republic and the Commission.303 
Like this Comment, none of Justice Stevens’s suggestions pretends to be a 
universal solution—nowhere does he say that in situation A, the court ought to 
follow course-of-action X to the exclusion of other considerations.  In the 
context of Pimentel and its facts, however, he identifies a number of 
convincing alternatives to the majority’s formulaic outcome.  Whether each 
would effectuate “complete justice” for the particular parties in Pimentel is, of 
course, a nonstarter at this point because the Court ordered dismissal of the 
Pimentel case, but the existence and plausibility of these alternatives proves 
that pragmatism in the face of sovereignty’s challenges can often yield 
sufficiently equitable solutions. 
The SourceOne court faced a situation substantially analogous to Pimentel 
but recognized the inequity wrought by dismissal.304  Accordingly, the court 
managed to distinguish Pimentel and proceed with the case.  The court’s 
solution was in effect to rebalance the importance of the various interests—as 
suggested above305—in a way that gave primacy to the interests of the parties 
already before the court and recognized the plaintiff’s nontrivial interest in the 
resolution of its dispute.  The court’s analysis was pragmatism at its best: it 
confronted precedent, thoroughly considered arguments for each side, and 
devised a solution that did not unfairly discriminate against the interests of 
either party.  Thus, while Pimentel presents dangerously inarticulate 
precedent,306 SourceOne is nonetheless an admirable example of a court 
getting it right, and represents the possibility of progress despite the precedent. 
Admittedly, this Comment’s proffered solutions may create situations in 
which the plaintiff enjoys some manner of relief other than that originally 
prayed for.307  These sorts of risks are acceptable in the face of the status quo 
alternative: complete dismissal that leaves the plaintiff without any recourse.  
 
 302 See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 303 See supra note 186. 
 304 See supra Part III.C. 
 305 See supra Part IV.C.3. 
 306 See supra Part III.C (discussing the difficulties Pimentel poses as precedent). 
 307 This is true of some of Justice Stevens’s suggestions, such as staying the proceedings to await 
adjudication in the Philippines, which was not part of the relief that Merrill sought. 
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Elevating pragmatism over dogmatism is, even at its worst, a net beneficial 
approach to Rule 19 and sovereign immunity.  An overuse of the power of 
dismissal scarcely effectuates—and more often impedes—the administration of 
justice.  Dismissal in the face of no alternate forum and no outlet for relief, i.e., 
the Pimentel “solution,” is a solution in name only,308 and courts from the 
district levels to the highest appellate bodies should redefine the contours of 
Rule 19 vis-à-vis sovereign immunity to minimize such an outcome in any 
instance. 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 19 has, since its inception, been a source of dispute and consternation 
among scholars.  These criticisms came to a head in the middle of the twentieth 
century and prompted a vast revision of the Rule with the stated goal of giving 
courts the flexibility to avoid unfair outcomes because of a blind adherence to 
labels or categorizations.  The criticisms of Rule 19 tended toward solutions 
much like those proffered herein because Rule 19 is not now—nor was it 
then—amenable to encapsulation within one binding framework.  It is a rule 
that, by its very nature, demands pragmatism on the part of the courts.  Despite 
the progress evident since the 1966 revision, the treatment of Rule 19 in the 
face of sovereign immunity suggests that in at least one area of the law courts 
are backsliding toward rigidity at the expense of dispensing effective relief.  It 
is imperative that courts and legislatures, to whatever degree relevant, avoid 
the temptation to allow their approaches to unique problems to become rote, 
predictable, and detrimental to the effectuation of justice. 
The solutions proposed herein are an attempted return to pragmatism and a 
reminder that when the doctrine of party joinder begins to slip again into 
unaccommodating definitional outcomes, it jeopardizes the entire impetus for 
the Rule: the desire to afford adequate and complete relief.  Shedding the 
reliance on labels and obstinate doctrines is not a revolutionary proposal; 
rather, it is a return to the underpinnings of modern Rule 19.  It is a return to 
the liberal application of 19(b) to promote the continuation and eventual 
resolution of disputes, to the conceptualization of a court deciding a 
controversy whenever it “possibly can do so,” and to an open-door policy of 
 
 308 See supra note 183. 
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justice where the shield of one party is not used to imperil the rights of the 
aggrieved by harboring the undeserving.309 
ROSS D. ANDRE∗ 
 
 
 309 Reed, supra note 4, at 337.  “While it is true that . . . there will be the possibility of further 
litigation[,] . . . such a prospect appears unlikely and would in any event be less undesirable than to leave the 
plaintiffs without a remedy.”  Id. at 337 n.27 (emphasis added) (quoting Black River Regulating Dist. v. 
Adirondack League Club, 121 N.Y.S.2d 893, 904 (App. Div. 1953), rev’d, 121 N.E.2d 428 (N.Y. 1954)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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